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INTRODUCTION
Copyright law's paramount goal is often said to be the provision
of incentives for producing new works,1 yet the literature on
copyright offers few concrete examples of how any legislatively
plausible changes in copyright law would have meaningful effects
on the variety of copyrighted works available to consumers. Those
who favor restricting copyright's scope or duration note that authors
necessarily build on the works of their predecessors.2 Because
copyright law does not protect ideas,3 however, they can point only
to peripheral categories of works that copyright law stymies, such
as counter-culture Mickey Mouse cartoon strips4 or digital sampling
of existing works.5 Meanwhile, those who defend copyright and seek
1. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("Mhe
ultimate aim is, by [copyright law's] incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general
public good."); 1 PAuL GOLDSmEiN, COPYRIGHT § 1.0 (2d ed. 1996) (stating that copyright law
attempts to "encourag[e] the production of the widest possible array of literary, musical and
artistic works"); Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281,291-321 (1970) (providing
a seminal economic analysis of whether copyright is necessary to provide adequate incentives
to create works); Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MIcH. L. Rrv. 409,428
(2002) ("The primary policy justification for copyright protection in the United States is the
incentive justification.").
2. This observation is central to William Landes and Richard Posner's seminal economic
analysis of copyright. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of
Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 332 (1989).
3. See, e.g., Feist Publ'ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,344-45 (1991) ("The
most fundamental axiom of copyright law is that '[no author may copyright his ideas or the
facts he narrates.') (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
556 (1985)).
4. In Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 756-58 (9th Cir. 1978), the Ninth
Circuit rejected a fair use defense for an alleged parody of the Mickey Mouse cartoon that
depicted Mickey Mouse in settings that were contrary to his traditional wholesome image. For
critical analyses of Air Pirates and the logic underlying it, see Wendy J. Gordon, A Property
Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual
Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1602-03 (1993); Liu, supra note 1, at 464-65; Jed Rubenfeld, The
Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 50, 52 n.159 (2002);
and Suheil Joseph Totah, Comment, In Defense of Parody, 17 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 57, 74
(1987).
5. See generally Randy S. Kravis, Comment, Does a Song by Any Other Name Still Sound
as Sweet?: Digital Sampling and Its Copyright Implications, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 231 (1993)
(discussing the copyright implications of digital sampling); Thomas C. Moglovkin, Note,
Original Digital: No More Free Samples, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 135 (1990) (same).
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to extend it bemoan the decline in profits that record companies
have suffered6 and that Hollywood may face.7 Yet they do not name
the musical groups that may be sent over the edge into bankruptcy
or the movies that would not have been made if anticipated sales
were slightly lower, and with good reason. In general, the works on
the borderline of being created are not the ones that consumers
would care about the most, and the outcome of contemporary
debates about copyright law's scope will impact only those marginal
works. It would thus be easy to conclude that debates on copyright
law, though perhaps a useful form of intellectual exercise, matter
only a bit in the real world.
Such a conclusion, however, would be unwarranted. Copyright
theorists often consider trade-offs between incentives to produce
new works and other values, in particular maximizing dissemina-
tion of existing works to users,8 a trade-off that is sometimes called
6. See, e.g., Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Recording Industry to Begin Collecting
Evidence and Preparing Lawsuits Against File 'Sharers" Who Illegally Offer Music Online, at
http-Jwww.riaa.com/news/newsletter/062503.asp (June 25, 2003) (quoting Recording Industry
Association of America President Cary Sherman as saying, "we cannot stand by while piracy
takes a devastating toll on artists, musicians, songwriters, retailers and everyone in the music
industry"). For evidence that services like Napster have in fact hurt the profits of record
companies, see Stan Liebowitz, Will MP3 Downloads Annihilate the Record Industry? The
Evidence so Far (June 2003) (unpublished manuscript), at httpJ/www.utdallas.edu/-liebowit
intprop/records.pdf (last visited Aug. 23, 2004).
7. See, e.g., Ronald Grover & Heather Green, The Digital Age Presents Hollywood Heist:
Will Tinseltown Let Techies Steal the Show?, BUS. WK., July 14,2003, at 73, 76 (reporting that
Hollywood executives are concerned that the movie industry may suffer the same loss of
profits suffered by the music industry).
8. Alireza Naghavi and Giinther Schulze offer the following recent summary of the
conventional wisdom:
For a welfare assessment of copyright protection, the negative static effects of
copyright protection need to be weighed against its positive dynamic effects. The
static effect is that the protected artistic product or the intellectual property
receives only suboptimal-dissemination, i.e. it is underconsumed. Given that a
product has been produced, it is optimal from a welfare point of view to sell it at
its marginal cost, which is typically very low.... Copyright protection puts the
producer in a monopolistic situation for the duration of the copyright thereby
ensuring positive profits. This establishes an incentive to produce innovations,
but at the same time reduces consumption compared to a non-monopolistic
situation. The optimal copyright protection balances the effect of increased
incentives to produce market innovations from higher protection against the
reduced consumption from it at the margin.
Alireza Jay Naghavi & Guinther G. Schulze, Bootlegging in the Music Industry: A Note, 12
EUR. J.L. & ECoN. 57, 62-63 (2001); see also Liu, supra note 1, at 429 ("Roughly speaking,
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the incentives-access paradigm.9 An expansive doctrine of fair use,
for example, may allow users greater access to copyrighted works,
but any expansion will decrease incentives to produce new works.'"
Yet there have been few attempts to make the trade-off any more
precise. In particular, scholars have not considered whether this
trade-off is the same regardless of the number of works that
copyright law generates. This Article argues that the greater the
success of copyright law in generating large numbers of works, the
more copyright law should care about access. Just because incen-
tives are the paramount goal of the copyright system as a whole
does not mean that they are the most important consideration at the
margins.
Copyrighted works can serve as imperfect substitutes for one
another, so the more works that exist of a particular type, the
greater the number of substitutes that will exist for any particular
work. The importance of incentives to produce new works is less
significant when the number of existing works and the chance that
a new work will be largely redundant are greater. Equivalently, the
goal of disseminating existing works should be of relatively great
significance in markets with large numbers of copyrighted works.
A world without copyright would be an impoverished one," but
changes along the edges of copyright law that lead to slight
reductions in the number of works produced but greater dissemi-
depending on the strength of the protection, we can have more works with more restricted
access, or fewer works with broader access.*).
9. See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm,
49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 492-98 (1996).
10. See, e.g., Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1105, 1110
(1990) ("The doctrine of fair use limits the scope of the copyright monopoly in furtherance of
its utilitarian objective.... Tihe use must be of a character that serves the copyright objective
of stimulating productive thought and public instruction without excessively diminishing the
incentives for creativity."); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: SonyRevisited,
82 B.U. L. REv. 975, 977 (2002) ("On the one side, a [fair use] may indirectly lead to fewer
works of authorship by reducing the incentives to create such works. On the other, allowing
such use to continue may directly improve the public's ability to use, transform, or otherwise
obtain access to existing works.").
11. That does not mean that a world without copyright would have no works at all. See
generally Breyer, supra note 1 (arguing that copyright law appears to be justified but that the
case is close); Arnold Plant, The Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books, 1 ECONOMICA 167,
168-70 (1934) (noting that many authors would continue to publish in the absence of
copyright).
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-nation of other works could increase social welfare. Similarly,
efforts to improve the ability of authors to control use and limit
duplication of copyrighted works might reduce social welfare, even
* if they result in modest increases in the number of works.
This Article elaborates the insight that marginal copyrighted
.works are not likely to produce large contributions to social welfare.
It does so by focusing on the economics of product differentiation, a
venerable area of study in industrial organization that until very
recently has received no sustained attention in copyright scholar-
ship,12 and limited attention in law-and-economics scholarship more
12. A recent article by Christopher Yoo considers the implications of the economics of
product differentiation for copyright law. See Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product
Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212 (2004). That Yoo and I were working on similar ideas
at the same time reinforces that many copyrighted works are close substitutes for one
another. Nonetheless, Yoo's work and mine are not nearly as close substitutes as the titles
suggest. The phenomenon of demand diversion, to be discussed shortly, lies at the center of
my account, but is peripheral in Yoo's. See id. at 260-64. Yoo argues that "the differentiated
products approach undercuts the conventional understanding that any measure that enhances
dynamic efficiency necessarily reduces static efficiency by showing how encouraging entry can
promote both considerations simultaneously." In other words, Yoo argues that if copyright can
increase incentives to create new works (thus, Yoo assumes, enhancing dynamic efficiency),
that change will also increase static efficiency, because additional entry will drive down prices
and benefit consumers. The simulation analysis in this Article offers a similar finding.
There is an important difference in emphasis between Yoo's approach and the approach
here, however. Yoo notes correctly that changes in copyright law may increase authors' ability
to appropriate surplus, and he suggests that these changes will in effect increase dynamic
efficiency by lowering prices and increasing access to consumers. What Yoo does not discuss
is that a policy increasing the appropriability of consumer surplus may have other direct
consequences, which might decrease consumer access with a potentially negative effect on
social welfare. Consider, for example, a law facilitating crackdowns on file sharers. Yoo's
analysis emphasizes that the law will increase appropriability, indirectly leading to a greater
number of works and lower prices. The analysis in this Article would also emphasize that the
increase in the number of works may contribute only slightly to consumer welfare, even
taking into account lower prices, as in the Salop model; meanwhile, the direct effect of the law
would be to limit consumer access to copyrighted works by discouraging file sharing.
The most relevant previous analysis appears in a brief discussion by Michael Meurer in an
article otherwise devoted to the significance of price discrimination in copyright law:
Producers of copyrighted works over-harvest from that common pool-a
particular producer does not account for the distraction his new work imposes
on existing works or other new works. As a result, multiple producers sometimes
race to get to the market first with essentially duplicative works. The race
causes two related social harms: producers rush products to market too soon and
the duplicative investment by competing producers is wasteful. Reducing the
reward to the copyright owner below expected total surplus alleviates the
negative effects from the race to the market.
Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOzo L. REV. 55, 96-97
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generally. ' The basic insight is a straightforward elaboration of the
intuition that once a number of choices exist in a particular genre,
further expansion of choice adds relatively little social value. The
problem, as it is termed in the literature, is that of demand
diversion, sometimes called "business stealing."14 A producer
entering a market with differentiated products cares about its own
profit and ignores the effect of entry on other producers. By writing
a vegetarian cookbook, I may be able to win many sales that
otherwise would have gone to the 445 vegetarian cookbooks that
already exist. 5 My entry into the cookbook market might thus be an
example of rent dissipation, because my investment in the cookbook
project is aimed in part at taking away rents (more commonly
known as profits) that the authors of existing cookbooks otherwise
would have enjoyed. Of course, my cookbook may offer some new
recipes, improvements on existing recipes, and other features that
benefit consumers, so my entry into the market might increase the
total rents available. The more cookbooks of a particular type that
already exist, however, the smaller this increase is likely to be.
In theory, I might rationally choose to write the cookbook even
though the increase in consumer welfare is less than the cost of
producing the cookbook. In such a circumstance, society might be
(2001); see also C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What It Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 311,
339-40 (1997) (noting the possibility of too many media companies, but not specifically
discussing the danger of too much media content). Meurer notes that this is particularly likely
to be an issue "when there are close substitutes for a ... new product in a market niche already
crowded with other similar products," and he concludes, "[t]his explains why current
investment in copyrighted works may be too high." Meurer, supra, at 97. The relevance of this
discussion to Meurer's immediate project is to offer a rebuttal to those who insist that price
discrimination necessarily increases social welfare by raising profits to copyright owners. Id.
at 95. Meurer does not consider the implications of demand diversion, if in fact such demand
diversion does not lead to overentry. This Article's argument is that even if demand diversion
does not produce the extreme of overentry, it remains relevant because of the trade-off
between production incentives and dissemination of existing works.
13. For an analysis of how product differentiation should affect merger analysis, see
Christopher A. Vellturo, Creating an Effective Diversion: Evaluating Mergers with
Differentiated Products, ANTITRUST, Spring 1997, at 16.
14. For an early discussion of the phenomenon, see N. Gregory Mankiw & Michael D.
Whinston, Free Entry and Social Inefficiency, 17 RAND J. ECON. 48, 49-50, 57 (1986).
15. See http'/Iwww.amazon.com/exec/obidos/search-handle-urlAndex%3Dbooks%26field-
keywords%3Dvegetarian%20cookbook (last visited May 22, 2004) (listing 445 vegetarian
cookbooks). No matter how original the 446th entrant, a substantial percentage of its sales
is likely to come from those of its competitors.
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better off if I had opened a restaurant instead of written a
cookbook.16 Though theoretically possible, the specter of overentry,
that is of a greater than socially optimal number of producers
entering the market, does not drive this Article's analysis. The
danger of overentry, after all, is not limited to markets for copy-
righted works. Perhaps we have too many restaurants, but we
probably would not tolerate a "restaurant board" that would block
entry in the restaurant market. 7 Such distrust in government
solutions would be even more appropriate in response to a proposal
for a "copyright board" that would screen new works. In addition, we
may suspect that many copyrighted works produce positive
externalities, making overentry far less likely to be a problem.'"
Even if there is no overentry in markets for copyrighted works,
however, this means only that existing copyrighted works produce
16. The opportunity cost of copyrighted works figures prominently in Lunney, supra note
9. Lunney explains:
If we broaden copyright, we increase the economic return on any given
authorship investment. We can thereby lure resources, in the form of labor and
capital, away from other productive endeavors into the production of copyrighted
works and lead the market to produce additional works. But to create these
additional works, we must strip the resources from other sectors of the economy.
Id. at 487-88. Lunney accordingly recognizes that copyright should seek to encourage
individuals to invest in authoring more valuable works. See id. at 490-91. Lunney, however,
does not consider product differentiation theory and arrives at conclusions quite different from
this Article's. See id. at 645-46 (advocating limits on derivative rights, though product
differentiation theory alone would appear to point in the opposite direction). For another
article offering a brief recognition of the opportunity cost of copyrighted works, see Robert M.
Hurt & Robert M. Schuchman, The Economic Rationale of Copyright, 56 AM. EcON. REV. 421,
425-26 (1966).
17. Such intolerance is not an inevitable aspect of a legal system, even of one that
encourages free enterprise. Jewish law, by the principle of hasagat gevul, prohibits the
creation of a business that will produce significant demand diversion. See generally CHAIM
JACHTER & EZVA FRAZER, GRAY MATrER: DIScOuRSES IN CONTEMPORARY HALACHAH 107-18
(2000), excerpt available at httpJ/www.jlaw.com/Articlesihasagatgevul.html (last visited May
22, 2004) (discussing the principle). The principle has even been applied to publishing,
providing a Jewish law version of copyright. See generally Israel Schneider, Jewish Law and
Copyright, at http'/www.jlaw.com/Articles/copyrightl.html (last visited May 22, 2004)
(discussing Jewish law's approach to copyright more broadly). Interestingly, however, there
is an exception for the teaching of Torah, suggesting that Talmudic sources recognized the
possibility that education might be a positive externality. See Dennis W. Carlton & Avi Weiss,
The Economics of Religion, Jewish Survival, and Jewish Attitudes Toward Competition in
Torah Education, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 253, 266-72 (2001). Of course, I do not imply that a
general prohibition on business stealing would improve economic efficiency, as virtually all
competition involves some degree of business stealing.
18. See infra Part II.A.2.a.
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more benefits to consumers than they cost to produce, not that
copyright law itself has achieved some form of global optimality.
Copyright theory cares about dissemination of existing works in
addition to production of new works, therefore, a legal change that
increases dissemination may be justified even if it imposes some
cost by reducing the number of new works. It is hard to imagine a
legal change that could reduce the number of restaurants while still
leaving restaurant patrons better off. An expansive fair use
doctrine, however, provides consumers greater access to existing
works while decreasing producers' incentives to produce new
works.19 Copyright scholars may be correct in assuming that this is
a trade-off, with the decreased production incentives counting as a
social cost.2" Demand diversion, however, reveals that a marginal
decrease in the number of new works might not be as much of a cost
as would otherwise appear. More concretely, demand diversion
reveals that the proportional increase in the size of the market
attributable to a new work generally will be greater than the
proportional increase in social welfare; the 446th vegetarian
cookbook is unlikely to increase consumer surplus from cookbooks
by even 1/446th. Rent dissipation analysis suggests that although
copyright law's paramount goal may be to increase incentives for the
production of new works, this goal may not be of as much signifi-
cance at the margin, and relatively more attention should be paid
to ensuring dissemination. The analysis provides some support to
those who argue that copyright law should provide consumers with
relatively broad, though presumably not unlimited, rights to copy
copyrighted works.
Demand diversion also deserves special attention in copyright law
because this area presents doctrinal questions that implicate broad
social welfare concerns for which the possibility of demand diversion
is relevant. The courts face questions like whether copyright can
19. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
20. In the patent context, one industrial organization economist has recognized that
decreased production might be a social benefit. See Michael Waterson, The Economics of
Product Patents, 80 AM. ECON. REv. 860, 867-68 (1990) (noting that patent law may make
society better off by discouraging entry and reducing business stealing). Waterson alludes
briefly to copyright in the last paragraph of his article, but his discussion assumes without
justification that redundancy is less likely to be problematic for copyright than for patent. Id.
at 869.
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protect a graphical user interface,2' or whether one song should be
* found to infringe a similar but not identical song.22 In answering
close questions about the breadth of property rights, judges may
consider policy ramifications such as the effects of decisions on
incentives to produce new works. Copyright law is a crude instru-
ment developed under conditions of gross uncertainty, 23 but it must
be made and developed under such conditions nonetheless. As long
as the copyright context, unlike many other economic contexts in
which demand diversion is a concern, routinely requires judges to
make decisions about the scope of property rights, judges might as
well take demand diversion into account. Some judges may even
intuit that it would not make much difference if society had
somewhat fewer books, movies or compact discs, but squelch the
sentiment, thinking they are being curmudgeonly.24
There is an additional reason that the phenomenon of demand
diversion is particularly salient in the copyright context. Although
in any market there will be benefits to consumers of successive
entry that may offset its costs, these benefits will be relatively low
in a market for copyrighted works. Copyrighted goods can be
reproduced for low marginal cost, and a relatively small number of
works therefore can serve an entire market. Even if there are an
excessive number of restaurants, each new restaurant increases the
total capacity of the restaurant market. The number of vegetarian
restaurants may determine how many people can enjoy ordering
hummus, but with just a single vegetarian cookbook, everyone can
21. See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Intl, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 818-19 (1st Cir. 1995),
affd by an equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233, 233-34 (1996) (considering whether the
interface of a spreadsheet program infringed the copyright on Lotus 1-2-3).
22. See, e.g., Arnatein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464,468-70 (2d Cir. 1946) (considering whether
musical compositions by Cole Porter infringed the plaintiff's copyrights).
23. See Lunney, supra note 10, at 978 (mWe do not know nearly as much as we sometimes
pretend regarding the economic working of the markets for copyrighted works, nor do we fully
understand the relationship between increased copyright revenues and the ultimate public
purpose of copyright--creation of additional works."); Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 22
(recognizing that copyright raises "incredibly complex empirical questions of economic
efficiency").
24. For an unabashedly curmudgeonly argument that there are too many books published
each year, see Joseph Epstein, Think You Have a Book in You? Think Again, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept.
28, 2002, at A17, which notes that "[s] omething on the order of 80,000 books get published in
America every year, most of them not needed, not wanted, not in any way remotely
necessary."
[Vol. 46:33
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enjoy making hummus. Successive entry conceivably could still
increase the quality of the best available product, but this consider-
ation may be less important in markets for copyrighted works. In
such markets, relative quality may rival absolute quality in
importance, making additional entry less significant. 25
It might seem that even a modest decline in the rate at which
copyrighted works are produced would result in a noticeably
impoverished culture. Film, music and literature, however, seemed
vibrant thirty or fifty years ago, even though the number of new
titles released on an annual basis was much lower.26 If some
percentage of copyrighted works never existed, our world might be
only a little less interesting. It is important to avoid allowing
cognitive tricks to affect our intuitive assessments of the value of
marginal works, that is, those that ex ante are expected to produce
the smallest profit. Though it might seem that if one-tenth of the
movies made last year had not been produced the world would have
been noticeably less satisfying, that may be in part for reasons of
cognitive salience.27 We remember the movies that we have seen,
but not those that we might have seen instead if a few of the movies
that we had seen had not been produced. Some works that receive
little attention today might receive much more in such a world. To
be sure, any decrease in the number of works produced decreases
consumer welfare. This consequence may be a cost worth bearing,
however, if the reason for the decrease is a change in the law
permitting greater copying of existing works. Perhaps copyright law
can allow all but the wealthiest of us to enjoy more movies or music
even if fewer movies are produced or less commercial music is
created.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 125-27.
26. This is evidenced in the increase in the number of copyright registrations, from
210,564 in 1950 to 515,612 in 2000, despite the decrease in the legal significance of
registration. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS
at 54 (2001), available at www.copyright.gov/reports/annual/2001/appendices.pdf; see also
Nat'l Arts Journalism Program, Best and Worst of Times: Best Books vs. Bestsellers in a
Changing Business (noting that the number of books published annually increased 300
percent from 1975 to 2000), at httpIlwww.najp.org/conferences/books/summary.html#stats
(last visited May 22, 2004).
27. For a discussion of how salience may have adverse effects on policy, see Timur Kuran
& Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683,736-46
(1999).
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Copyright is important for reasons other than economics, and
recent commentators have analyzed the role of copyright in
democratic governance.28 It might seem that even if a marginal
decrease in the number of copyrighted works imposes only a small
cost from an economic standpoint, marginal works may be vital
from a democratic point of view. This claim collapses under close
analysis, however, and not just because the vast majority of
copyrighted works add little to democratic deliberation. The
dissemination of existing works is as important to democratic as to
economic theory. If rent dissipation theory recommends, for
example, broad fair use, there is no a priori reason to believe that
democracy demands a different balance. It is even possible to
construct a case that we might be better off with somewhat fewer
works that clearly comment on public policy, because a significant
democratic function produced by copyrighted works is to challenge
individuals' prior opinions. Diversification of works may contribute
to this function to some extent, by exposing individuals to a wide
range of points of view, but it also may allow individuals to select
products that only reinforce their pre-existing views. The point here,
of course, is not to argue that democratic theorists should seek ways
of discouraging contributions to public discourse. Rather, it is to
show that the significance of marginal works is complicated in
both democratic and economic theories, and that the democratic
considerations at least do not produce a definitive rebuttal to the
claim that slight reductions in the number of new works might
be beneficial if those reductions are accompanied by increased
dissemination of other works.
Part I explores the economics of product differentiation. After
focusing on one article that helps illustrate concretely the problem
of business stealing, the discussion draws on the broader literature
to explain how variations in the assumptions of this model might
produce competing effects. Part I also reports the results of an
original simulation study (reported in full in the Appendix). The
study reinforces the argument that business stealing is a greater
concern in low marginal cost markets, and it shows that regardless
of whether there is overentry or underentry, permitting some
28. See infra sources cited notes 158-59.
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copying may increase consumer welfare. Part II supplements the
analysis with a number of different perspectives, canvassing a range
of economic arguments, including distributional concerns and
various forms of externality arguments, as well as democratic
theory. Perhaps most interestingly, it explains how the concept of
demand diversion can improve on a prominent account of "winner-
take-all" markets. The winner-take-all account is most persuasive
with respect to markets for copyrighted works, and attention to
demand diversion can better explain the possibility of excess entry
than the winner-take-all nature of markets upon which that account
has focused. Finally, Part III briefly considers the dual applications
of peer-to-peer technology and the copyright term, and evaluates
two broader potential implications of the analysis: that copyright
law can seek to achieve distributive justice without much cost and
that copyright law should become less expansive over time.
I. COPYRIGHT AND THE ECONOMICS OF PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION
The earliest and still probably the most famous work on the
economics of product differentiation is Hotelling's model of two
firms, both selling the same product, deciding where to locate along
a straight line.29 Customers, it is assumed, are uniformly distributed
over the line and will purchase from the nearest firm, unless a lower
price from a firm located farther away justifies the additional
transportation costs. The firms, for example, might be ice cream
salesmen along a beach."0 The model shows that, in the absence of
cooperation, if every consumer will buy an ice cream from one of the
salesmen, the two salesmen will both cluster at the center of the
beach. The result is intuitive. If either salesman is on one side of the
beach rather than at the center, he can pick up more customers by
moving closer to the center. Once both are at the center, neither has
an incentive to move, because doing so would lead some consumers
to switch to the competitor. From a social standpoint, the result is
29. Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 ECON. J. 41, 44-50 (1929), reprinted in
1 PUBUIC CHOICE THEORY 3, 6-12 (Charles K. Rowley ed., 1993).
30. Hotelling suggested that the line "may be Main Street in a town or a transcontinental
railroad." Id. at 45. The advantage of the beach metaphor is that it makes more plausible the
assumption that no consumer will travel off the line to obtain the product.
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suboptimal, as customers' transport costs would be minimized if the
salesmen located at one-quarter and three-quarters the length of
the beach.
Although the producers in Hotelling's model are selling a
homogeneous product, the model provides a metaphor for product
differentiation, with location in physical space analogous to location
in product space. For example, two adjacent Indian restaurants
deciding how spicy to make their food, given a uniform range of
customer preferences, might both sell moderately spicy food, even
though consumer tastes would better be satisfied if one restaurant
sold mild-medium and the other medium-spicy. The Hotelling
metaphor has perhaps had its most significant application in
political science, as a way of explaining why the platforms of two
competing political parties might both tend toward moderation.31
The literature offers numerous variations on the basic Hotelling
setup,32 with some variations producing dramatic changes in results.
Perhaps most surprisingly, d'Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse
altered Hotelling's assumptions in such a way that the ice cream
vendors would choose to locate on opposite extremes of the beach,
thus achieving maximum, rather than minimum, differentiation.33
They assume4 that customers faced quadratic transportation costs,
so traveling three miles was nine times worse than traveling one
mile.34 The result of maximum differentiation followed from the
31. Hotelling himself recognized this application:
The competition for votes between the Republican and Democratic parties does
not lead to a clear drawing of issues, an adoption of two strongly contrasted
positions between which the voter may choose. Instead, each party strives to
make its platform as much like the other's as possible. Any radical departure
would lose many votes, even though it might lead to stronger commendation of
the party by some who would vote for it anyhow. Each candidate "pussyfoots,"
replies ambiguously to questions, refuses to take a definite stand in any
controversy for fear of losing votes.
Id. at 54. Commentators seized on the political analogy relatively quickly and used it to
explain subsequent electoral results. See, e.g., A. Smithies, Optimum Location in Spatial
Competition, 49 J. POL. ECON. 423, 423 (1941).
32. For a survey of the literature, see Dominique Graitson, Spatial Competition a la
Hotelling: A Selective Survey, 31 J. INDUS. ECON. 13 (1982).
33. C. d'Aspremont et al., On Hotelling's 'Stability in Competition," 47 ECONOMETRICA
1145, 1145 (1979) (arguing that Hotelling's theory is invalid).
34. Id. at 1148.
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recognition that firms would locate as far from each other as
possible to minimize price competition.1
This Part's focus is not on whether there is too much or too little'
differentiation among works that are produced, but whether too
many or too few works are produced. It is worth noting, however;
that the phenomena are analytically connected. Commentators have
observed homogeneity in radio station offerings, as listeners with
minority viewing tastes may receive no attention while those with
more typical tastes can choose from a number of stations seemingly
distinguishable only by their call letters.36 This might occur because
a radio station owner would rather have a small piece of a large
market than all of a small market, regardless of the fact that the
listeners will simply be transplanted from other stations. Catering
to the otherwise neglected aficionado of ragtime or gospel music
might maximize the number of people who spend time listening to
radio and consequently increase social welfare 37 but it often will be
in the radio station's interest simply to produce yet another top 40
or oldies offering. The number of radio stations, of course, is
constrained by the radio frequency spectrum, but the number of
many other media is essentially unlimited.3' The problem then
35. Id. at 1149. Hotelling's model also included the possibility of price competition.
Hotelling, supra note 29, at 45-47. In the absence of quadratic transportation costs, however,
neither producer would have an incentive to move away from the other in order to reduce such
competition.
36. See, e.g., Peter Siegelman & Joel Waldfogel, Race and Radio: Preference Externalities,
Minority Ownership, and the Provision of Programming to Minorities, in 10 ADVANCES IN
APPLIED MCROECOOMICS:ADVERTISiNGAND DInFERENTATED PRODUCTS 73,98-101 (Michael
Baye & Jon P. Nelson eds., 2001); see also LISA GEORGE & JOEL WALDFOGEL, WHO BENEFITS
WHOM IN DAILY NEWSPAPER MARKETS?, 1-4, 24 (Natl Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 7944, 2000) (reaching a similar conclusion with respect to newspaper markets),
available forpurchase at http'//papers.nber.org/paperstw7944.pdf (last visited May 22,2004).
37. Maximizing the number of listeners, however, is not the same as maximizing listeners'
welfare. As David Haddock and Daniel Polsby point out, what is relevant is how much
listeners value their listening, and it is thus possible that increased diversity of programming
choices might maximize listeners at the expense of listeners' welfare. See David D. Haddock
& Daniel D. Polsby, Bright Lines, the Federal Communications Commission's Duopoly Rule,
and the Diversity of Voices, 42 FED. COMM. L.J. 331, 342 (1990) (noting that "there can be too
much diversity for the public good, if the public good is to be measured by the value that
members of the public place on the programming that they are offered").
38. This distinction has at least one important consequence. With a very small number
of competitors, marginal entrants may on average be less redundant than the initial entrants
after the first. For example, it may be that the first five stations are all top 40 offerings, while
a sixth station decides to cater to a minority taste. With larger numbers of works in particular
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becomes not only excessive clustering by those who have entered the
market, but also excessive entry into the relevant market. To see
why this is, let us consider an alternative to the Hotelling model,
and then a variety of extensions and complications.
A. The Salop Model
1. The Setup
The Salop product differentiation model will allow us to see how
entry into an industry with differentiated products could be socially
excessive.39 Although the Salop model itself produces excessive
entry, my intent is simply to show that excessive entry is possible,
not that it is inevitable. This model can then serve as a baseline to
compare with other variations that might produce optimal or
inadequate entry into a market.' In the Salop product differentia-
tion model, firms locate around a circle instead of along a straight
line."1 For example, the firms may be gas stations located around a
lake, though once again the physical lake can serve as a metaphor
for product space. A consumer who incurs a relatively high trans-
port cost driving around the lake to reach a gas station, therefore,
is analogous to one in product space who suffers from not being
able to find the cookbook perfectly tailored to the consumer's needs.
The cookbook purchaser's "transport costs" do not refer to actual
transportation at all, but simply to buying a cookbook whose
selection of recipes is not quite what the consumer was seeking.
One advantage of the circle metaphor relative to the line is
conceptual. Product diversity in many markets is not linear, because
products vary along more than one dimension. For example,
consider Figure 1, illustrating four cookbooks. Traveling around the
circle, the cookbooks promise recipes on French appetizers, Italian
appetizers, Italian entrees, and French entrees. One could imagine
genres, marginal works are much more likely to be redundant than earlier works, although
as the radio example suggests, the relationship is not systematic. (I am grateful to Thomas
Nachbar for this point.)
39. See Steven C. Salop, Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods, 10 BELL J. ECON.
141, 142-45 (1979).
40. See infra Part I.B.
41. Salop, supra note 39, at 144.
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more points on the circle. A cookbook might cover Italian cooking,
and it could be placed between Italian appetizers and Italian
entrees on the circle, or a cookbook on French and Italian appetizers
could be located between the French appetizers and Italian
appetizers on the circle.42 Regardless of the number of entrants, the
circle reflects that there are no extremes, there are simply a variety
of products that are more or less like one another. Even the circle is
an imperfect reflection of reality, however. The cookbook example
is admittedly artificial, and any attempt to place an entire genre of
actual works around a circle in a coherent way is likely to fail. A
more realistic representation might allow for entry in n-dimensional
space, an extension that I undertake through a simulation model in
the Appendix.
Figure 1: A simple illustration of the Salop model
Frnch appemenr
Fr h envees Italian appe0rc
The more significant advantage of the circle metaphor is that it
is mathematically tractable relative to both the straight line and n-
dimensional space. If products are spaced equidistantly around the
circle, then from an economic standpoint, each producer is in the
same position as every other and makes the same decisions. The
circle metaphor facilitates the calculation of a symmetric Nash
42. Of course, there may not be books in the real world with precisely that focus, but there
certainly are books that are close. See, e.g., DIANA SHAW, SWEET BASIL, GARLIc, TOMATOES,
AND CHIVES: THE VEGETABLE DISHES OF TuscANY AND PROVENCE (1992).
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equilibrium-that is, an equilibrium in which each producer reaches
the same pricing decision and from which each producer has no
incentive to deviate." In Salop's model, all firms enter at once,
spacing themselves evenly around the circle. This assumes away the
question of whether there is too much or too little differentiation for
a given number of firms, permitting a focus on the number of firms
that enter rather than where they locate." Consumers are distrib-
uted uniformly around the circle and, in a temporary simplification
of Salop's model,4 we will assume that each will make a purchase
from exactly one firm, taking into account their transportation costs
to the firms. Transportation costs increase linearly with distance, so
traveling a distance of two is twice as bad as traveling a unit
distance.
After the firms enter, each will set a price that maximizes its
future profits.46 Collusion among firms is assumed to be impossible.
Each firm must pay a fixed cost to enter, but because this fixed cost
is sunk, it does not directly affect a firm's pricing decision. All firms
sell the same homogeneous good47 and face the same marginal cost;
they differ only in spatial location around the circle. Each firm
considers that increases in price will provide more revenue from
each consumer who still purchases from that firm, but increases in
price may lead some consumers to travel to one of the firm's
neighbors along the circle. Each firm takes into account the
expected pricing decisions of neighboring firms, but each firm will
realize that because the circle is uniform, each firm is making
exactly the same calculation as every other firm. Each firm
43. For an introduction to the concept of a Nash equilibrium, see DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET
AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAw 21-23 (1994).
44. Jean Tirole explains, l[tlhe point of Salop's model is not to look at the particular
product choice but rather to study the extent of entry .... Omitting the choice of location allows
us to study the entry issue in a simple and tractable way." JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 283 (2001).
45. Salop considers the possibility that some consumers will not be served. See Salop,
supra note 39, at 144-45. I will relax this assumption infra Part I.B.1.
46. The model does not consider the possibility of price discrimination based on distance.
If such discrimination were possible, then firms might have an incentive to charge less to
more distant consumers. Because all firms are identically situated, however, any attempts at
price discrimination ultimately would fail, as the firm closest to each consumer would be able
to meet any price decrease and still obtain the consumer.
47. Note that it is the difference in space that corresponds to product differentiation, so
sale of a homogeneous product is a useful simplification.
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therefore ends up calculating the uniform price from which no
firm would have an incentive to deviate upwards or downwards. The
greater the number of firms, the lower this price will be. Given a
uniform price, each consumer ends up traveling to the firm closest
to it, even though consumers would be willing to travel to more
distant producers if their prices were lower. One of the attractions
of the model is that it allows for price competition without producing
a complex asymmetric equilibrium in which each producer charges
a different price.
The analysis so far has assumed some number of firms entering
the market, but a central question for our purposes is how many
firms will enter. The number of firms that enter is assumed to be
the number that will lead to each firm's earning zero economic
profit given the optimal pricing strategy. Zero economic profit
corresponds to a normal rate of return on investments of capital and
labor." This assumption reflects that if, given a certain number of
entrants, greater than normal returns were expected, some other
firms would decide to enter the market too. 9 The assumption of zero
economic profits is central to many models of industrial organiza-
tion, and the allowance of free entry is what justifies it.' Additional
entry will, even apart from any price effect, lower existing produc-
ers' profits. If it did not cost anything to enter the market, then the
only nonprice effect of additional entry would be to reduce transport
costs, and entry would necessarily be socially beneficial. The fixed
cost of entry, however, dissipates what otherwise would be the
economic rent enjoyed by a small number of producers extracting
higher prices from consumers. The ultimate social welfare calculus
demands a determination of whether the fixed cost investments are
sufficient to justify the corresponding reductions in transport costs.
48. A definition of "economic profit" is "[t]he amount by which total revenues exceed total
opportunity cost." ROBERT B. EKELUND, JR. & ROBERT D. TOLLISON, ECONOMICS G-6 (4th ed.
1994).
49. The analysis ignores the "integer constraint," i.e., that the number of firms that enter
must be an integer and not a fractional number. See, e.g., Mankiw & Whinston, supra note
14, at 49. A small degree of supernormal returns is possible if an additional entrant would not
only eliminate those returns for all firms, but also make total returns for each firm negative.
50. "Free entry" here means that anyone can enter, not that anyone can enter for free.
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2. The Results
Salop's model produces several interesting results. First, the
number of competitive firms is equal to the square root of unit
transport costs times the number of consumers divided by fixed
costs.51 As expected, the formula shows that increases in transporta-
tion costs increase entry, because such increases raise the amount
that a firm can charge without losing customers nearest it to
another firm. Increases in the number of consumers raise entry too,
for the obvious reason that more consumers mean a larger market.
Meanwhile, smaller fixed costs increase entry because they allow
more firms to enter before the positive profits dissipate. Second,
each firm charges a price above marginal cost, specifically, marginal
cost plus the square root of the product of unit transport and fixed
costs divided by the number of consumers.52 When transport costs
rise, price competition is muted, because each producer needs to
worry less about a consumer defecting to another producer. Price
rises with increases in fixed costs, meanwhile, because of the
assumption of zero economic profit in equilibrium. Increased fixed
costs mean that firms must recover more to break even.5"
The most interesting conclusion of Salop's model for our purposes
is that the optimal number of firms from the perspective of the
51. Salop, supra note 39, at 148.
52. Id.
53. What may be less intuitive than the general direction of all these relationships is that
the effects are sublinear, as indicated by the square root signs. The number of firms changes
only slowly with increases in transport costs or decreases in fixed costs, and prices increase
only slowly with increases in transport or fixed costs. For example, if transport costs increase
by a factor of nine, the number of firms will increase by only a factor of three, and the
difference between price and marginal cost also will increase by only a factor of three. The
interrelationship between price and the number of entering firms explains this. The increased
entry attributable to a rise in transport costs tends to reduce price, because more firms are
crowded around the circle and thus alternative choices are more attractive to consumers. The
increase in price attributable to transport costs will therefore not be as high as it would be in
a hypothetical world where entry made the market no more crowded. Because the increase
in price is sublinear, the increase in entry is sublinear too. Similarly, because an increase in
fixed costs increases price, more firms will enter, so the overall decrease in the number of
firms that enter in response to an increase in fixed costs is smaller than it would be if an
increase in fixed costs had no effect on price. The small size of this decrease, meanwhile,
limits the amount by which the price can rise. In effect, the effects of transport or fixed costs
are shared by relatively modest changes in the number of entering firms and the equilibrium
price.
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social planner is exactly half the number that enter in equilibrium.5 4
This result reflects the central intuition of this Article: new entrants
steal business from existing entrants. The model shows more than
this, however, because the model recognizes that increased entry
provides a benefit to consumers by reducing the distance that they
must travel to obtain the product, whether in geographical or
product space. What is arresting is that Salop's model shows that
even though there are competing effects, one effect tends to
dominate the other. Salop himself acknowledges that this finding
might not be robust,"5 and we will examine how changing some of
Salop's assumptions might change the results.5 6 Before we do so,
however, let us develop an intuitive grasp of Salop's conclusion that
entry is twice the optimum, with the fixed cost associated with the
marginal entrant in equilibrium necessarily exceeding any benefits
to consumers from that entrant.
The central intuition underlying the Salop model is that in
deciding whether to raise their price above any hypothetical
equilibrium price, firms face inframarginal consumers. These are
consumers who are so close to the firm that they will continue to
purchase from it even if price increases, as long as the difference
between the firm's price and its neighbors' is not too great. Because
firms make this calculation at the same time, the equilibrium price
ends up being relatively high, representing the point that even
though an increase in price would cause a firm to lose only marginal
consumers, it would still lose money from pricing any higher.
Meanwhile, entry benefits both marginal and inframarginal
consumers, but by a relatively small amount, especially in the case
of inframarginal consumers. The tendency of distance to mute price
competition therefore, leads to relatively high prices that in turn
lead to entry beyond the point at which consumer benefits would
justify the fixed costs of such entry.
This explanation is not proof that excessive entry will result,
although Salop does prove the result. Salop derives his results with
calculus, but I will offer an informal demonstration of the conclusion
that twice as much entry as is socially optimal will occur to
54. Salop, supra note 39, at 152.
55. Id. at 156.
56. See infra Part I.B.
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crystallize the intuition developed above. Social welfare is the sum
of consumer welfare and producer welfare. To maximize social
welfare, therefore, we must minimize the sum of transport and fixed
costs. We can disregard both gross consumer surplus and price,
because of the assumption that every consumer will purchase one
unit of the product regardless of the price. That is, we do not care
how high prices are, because high prices simply affect the relative
welfare of consumers and producers and by assumption do not
result in any deadweight loss. Regardless of the number of firms,
any change in the number of firms will have a proportionate effect
on fixed costs and transport costs, so that, for example, doubling the
number of firms will double fixed costs and halve transport costs.
The social optimum therefore must be the number that equalizes
fixed costs and transportation costs.
57
This social optimum is not a stable equilibrium, because firms
would earn profits at this point and thus more will enter the
market. Firms will earn profits because the profit margin will be
more than enough to cover fixed costs. The price margin, the
difference between price and marginal cost, will always be equal to
the transportation costs of traveling from one firm to its neighbor,
regardless of how many firms have entered the market.' No
consumer will ever have to travel that far, however. The farthest a
consumer will have to travel is half the distance between two firms,
and the average consumer will have to travel only one-fourth the
distance. The price margin will therefore always be equal to four
times the transportation costs of an average consumer. At the social
optimum, however, we have seen that fixed costs are equal to
transportation costs. The price margin must then be equal to four
times the fixed costs per consumer as well. Three-quarters of this
price margin is profit at the social optimum, and firms will enter
57. If fixed costs and transportation costs are both 1, then doubling either and halving the
other would produce a sum of 2% instead of 2.
58. Salop proves this mathematically, but it is also shown by a consideration of firms'
incentives. At this price, any firm's attempt to increase or decrease its price will result in lost
profits. For example, if a firm raises its price margin by 25% (one-quarter of the transport
costs between the firm and each of its neighbors), then it will lose 25% of its customers, as the
marginal customer will be three-eighths of the distance between the firm and its neighbor,
rather than one-half of that distance. If instead the firm lowers its price by 25%, it will
increase its customer base by 25%. Both of these moves are unprofitable.
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the market. Doubling the number of firms doubles fixed costs while
cutting transport costs and the price margin in half. This eliminates
profit. The net result is that twice as many firms enter in equilib-
rium as would exist at the socially optimal level.
3. The Counterintuition: Pecuniary Externalities
One response to the claim that business stealing might lead to
excessive entry is to point to the distinction between pecuniary and
technological externalities. An externality is an effect of an individ-
ual's activity on someone else. Externalities can be negative or
positive. A classic example of a negative externality is pollution;
the polluter does not bear the full cost of its activity. An example
of a positive externality is vaccination, which benefits not only
the patient but also third parties. 9 Externalities can also be
pecuniary or technological, with pecuniary externalities being
those that operate through markets.' More formally, a technological
externality is an externality that affects the production function of
a firm. For example, if my pollution causes my neighbor's cows to
develop more slowly, then my neighbor will be able to produce less
beef or milk for a given combination of cows and feed, creating a
technological externality. An externality is pecuniary if an effect is
felt despite no change in the production function. For example, if I
also decide to become a beef producer, then I may hurt my neighbor
both by driving up the price of inputs and by driving down the price
of outputs, but my neighbor will still be able to make the same
amount of beef for any combination of cows and feed.
The externalities associated with the business-stealing effect are
pecuniary, as entry by one firm affects other firms' ability to sell
their products, but not their ability to produce products. This may
seem puzzling, because economists often emphasize that while
technological externalities produce market imperfections, and thus
are candidates for governmental intervention, pecuniary exter-
nalities do not. Consider, for example, Judge Posner's discussion of
pecuniary externalities in his Economic Analysis of Law:
59. See, e.g., EKELUND & TOLLISON, supra note 48, at 445.
60. For a useful discussion of the distinction, see Randall G. Holcombe & Russell S. Sobel,
Public Policy Toward Pecuniary Externalities, 29 PUB. FIN. REV. 304, 306-07 (2001).
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Competition is a rich source of "pecuniary" as distinct from
"technological" externalities-that is, of wealth transfers from,
as distinct from cost impositions on, unconsenting parties.
Suppose A opens a gas station opposite B's gas station and as a
result siphons revenues from B. Since B's loss is A's gain, there
is no diminution in overall wealth and hence no social cost, even
though B is harmed by A's competition and thus incurs a private
cost.61
The example initially seems superficially similar to the present
problem, but the comparison is imperfect. In Posner's example, A's
gas station is "opposite" B's, but the central point of Salop's model
is that firms are located in different places. Even apart from this
difference, however, the example is flawed, at least if it is intended
as a general statement that the pecuniary externality does not
matter. Indeed, if A had to pay a fixed cost to open her gas station,
then there would be a diminution in wealth if there were no other
effects, because A might have invested the money instead on an
activity that increases economic activity. Of course, there might well
be other effects, such as a decrease in the price of gas closer to the
marginal cost, allowing some who value gas at more than its
marginal cost to obtain it, and thus avoiding deadweight loss. My
point, of course, is not that business stealing is necessarily bad, but
merely that it must be taken into account.
Posner is not the only economist to hint that pecuniary externali-
ties should be ignored,62 and this conventional wisdom makes sense
under conditions of perfect competition.' It has long been recog-
61. RIcHARD A. POSNER, ECONoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAw 7 (5th ed. 1998).
62. Holcombe and Sobel provide another example:
Because efficiency requires individuals to take into account technological
externalities but requires that they ignore pecuniary externalities, it follows
that property rights should be defined over the ownership of all goods and
services in an economy to eliminate technological externalities but should not
be defined over the value of goods and services.
Holcombe & Sobel, supra note 60, at 308-09.
63. It may also make sense under conditions of imperfect competition if the solution is
worse than the problem. The point was recognized shortly after the distinction between
technical and pecuniary externalities emerged. See, e.g., J.A. Stockfisch, External Economies,
Investment, and Foresight, 63 J. POL. ECON. 446, 448 (1955) ("[A] large number of private
investors may have among them more knowledge than a central planning agency, whose
members can also make errors in judgment.").
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nized, however, that pecuniary externalities may lead to suboptimal
results when the economy is not in a condition of competitive
equilibrium. Tibor Scitovsky, who first developed the distinction
between pecuniary and technological externalities fifty years ago,4
recognized that although pecuniary externalities do not require
accommodation in competitive equilibrium, 65 they may matter at
other times. Scitovsky focused directly on investment, identifying
conditions in which investment produces pecuniary externalities
that ideally would be internalized.6 Although investment in a
market will tend to bring that market closer to equilibrium,
Scitovsky noted, it might lead another market away from equilib-
rium.6 7 Even though the specific example that Scitovsky cites
involves a positive externality,' the Salop model provides just one
example in the industrial organization literature of a negative
pecuniary externality that matters. Indeed, pecuniary externalities
matter so often in industrial organization and economic develop-
ment that the phrase is rarely invoked, and when it is invoked it
may be to point out that they may well matter in conditions of
imperfect competition.69
64. Tibor Scitovsky, Two Concepts of External Economies, 62 J. POL. ECON. 143, 146
(1954).
65. Scitovsky noted, "equilibrium in a perfectly competitive economy is a situation of
Paretian optimum, except when there is interdependence among the members of the economy
that is direct, in the sense that it does not operate through the market mechanism." Id. at
144. In other words, perfect competition maximizes welfare except when there are
technological externalities. Later, he explained:
What is puzzling ... is that interdependence through the market mechanism
should be held to account for the failure of the market economy to lead to the
socially desirable optimum, when equilibrium theory comes to the opposite
conclusion and relies on market interdependence to bring about an optimum
situation. Pecuniary external economies clearly have no place in equilibrium
theory.
Id. at 146.
66. Id. at 147-51.
67. Id. at 148.
68. Id. at 149 ("We can conclude, therefore, that when an investment gives rise to
pecuniary external economies, its private profitability understates its social desirability.").
Scitovsky uses the phrase "external economies" to refer to what are now known as positive
externalities, and the phrase "external diseconomies" to refer to what are now known as
negative externalities.
69. For example, Paul Krugman writes:
In competitive general equilibrium, of course, pecuniary externalities have no
welfare significance and could not lead to the kind of interesting dynamics we
shall derive later. Over the past decade, however, it has become a familiar point
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B. Modifying the Salop Model
The Salop model developed in Part L.A involves a 'series of
simplifications. That there might be too many books, movies, or
music albums under some set of credible assumptions is an
important result for legal decision makers for two reasons. First, it
undermines the assumption that any increase in incentives to
produce new works is necessarily beneficial. Indeterminacy itself is
relevant to policy decisions, because if we have no more reason to
believe that a change in production incentives is likely to be
beneficial than that it is likely to be harmful, we should respond by
paying more attention to those effects that we can classify as
improving or harming welfare. Second, the question of whether any
particular market is beyond or short of the point at which entry
decreases welfare is ultimately not the most significant one. That
would be the relevant question if the government were considering
establishing a board to restrict entry in some market or across the
economy."0 The focus of this Article, however, is on the business-
stealing effect, which might be relevant even if entry would
maximize social welfare, when only the producer and consumers
who purchase the product are counted in that calculation. Nonethe-
less, to develop the fullest understanding of when excessive entry
may occur, we should probe the assumptions of the Salop model to
test its robustness and to determine where it is most applicable. The
that in the presence of imperfect competition and increasing returns, pecuniary
externalities matter; for example, if one firm's actions affect the demand for the
product of another firm whose price exceeds marginal cost, this is as much a
"real" externality as if one firm's research and development spills over into the
general knowledge pool.
Paul Krugman, Increasing Returns and Economic Geography, 99 J. POL. EcoN. 483, 485
(1991). The results here do not depend on increasing returns, but Krugman's general point
that pecuniary externalities may matter in imperfect competition is relevant. For other
examples of articles explaining that pecuniary externalities may affect welfare, see Lee Hsien
Loong & Richard Zeckhauser, Pecuniary Externalities Do Matter When Contingent Claims
Markets Are Incomplete, 97 Q. J. ECON. 171 (1982); and Suzanne Scotchmer, Local Public
Goods in an Equilibrium: How Pecuniary Externalities Matter, 16 REGIONAL SCI. & URB.
EcON. 463 (1986).
70. In developing the distinction between technological and pecuniary externalities,
Scitovsky considers such a possibility, without explicitly endorsing it. See Scitovsky, supra
note 64, at 150 ("Hence the belief that there is need either for centralized investment planning
or for some additional communication system to supplement the pricing system as a signaling
device."). The primary problem with such a project is that the costs of errors by a central
government authority might outweigh the benefits, especially if government officials have
motivations other than maximizing social welfare.
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conclusion is that some models predict excessive entry while others
predict inadequate entry, but all at least are unanimous in acknowl-
edging the existence of the business-stealing effect.
1. Variability in Consumer Surplus
Perhaps the most vulnerable assumption in the presentation of
the Salop model above is that each consumer will purchase exactly
one unit of the good. This permitted us to ignore gross consumer
surplus, thus focusing on the trade-off between transport costs and
entry costs. The assumption may work well for some markets, such
as the market for textbooks or casebooks, as few students will dare
not purchase an assigned textbook and few professors will dare
assign more than one. It is, however, a simplification, especially
across the range of markets protected by copyright. I may own a
bookshelf full of vegetarian cookbooks, and my decision whether to
buy the latest book on lentils may depend in part on its price. Each
new cookbook that I purchase increases my gross consumer surplus.
Moreover, I may be pleased that my cookbooks cover the full range
of vegetarian cooking, rather than all focusing on my favorite topic
of tofu preparation. At the same time, of course, your cookbook
collection might not contain a single vegetarian cookbook, even
though you would be willing to add one if you could find the perfect
cookbook at the right price.
This reality check seems to force three distinct modifications to
the model.7' First, a single consumer might be located at multiple
locations around the circle. Ideally, I might like an Indian vegetar-
ian cook book, a vegetarian desserts book, and an encyclopedia of
soy products, and for each of these I will have to consider whether
the best book available is close enough to what I am looking for.
Second, a consumer might be willing to purchase cookbooks only if
transport costs are sufficiently low, that is, only if the cookbook is
just what the consumer is looking for. Third, a consumer might be
willing to purchase a cookbook only if the price is sufficiently low,
even if the cookbook is ofjust the sort that the consumer is seeking.
71. Consumers might be heterogeneous in ways beyond those described here. Michael
Waterson, for example, considers the possibility of heterogeneity in his assessment of how
easy it might be to serve consumers. See Michael Waterson, Product Differentiation and
Profitability: An Asymmetric Model, 39 J. INDus. ECON. 113 (1990). This type of heterogeneity
seems less likely to be significant in markets for copyrighted works than in many other
markets.
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That is, even in the absence of transport costs, the gross consumer
surplus might be above marginal cost but potentially below what
might be the equilibrium price of a book.
The first of these modifications is relatively harmless. For
analytical purposes, a consumer who is located at multiple points on
the circle can be treated as multiple consumers, and so the model
works just as before. If I wish to purchase a vegetarian desserts
book and an Indian vegetarian cookbook for my bookshelf, that is no
different economically than if I wanted to purchase the first for
myself and the second for my sister, or if I wanted to purchase the
first and my sister wished to purchase the second. An objection is
that this is not a fully accurate depiction of consumer preferences,
because the purchase decisions may be interrelated. A consumer
who buys one cookbook might be less willing to buy another. For
example, once I buy a vegetarian desserts book, I will be willing to
buy an Indian vegetarian cookbook only if it is exactly what I was
looking for or only if it is sufficiently inexpensive, because I have
spent a portion of my budget that I had allocated to cookbooks.72
This objection primarily means that the second "consumer"
associated with a particular individual is one subject to the second
and third modifications above.
Let us now consider the second modification, the possibility of a
consumer who decides not to purchase because of high transport
costs. Fortunately, this is an alteration to the model that Salop
himself considers, one that I omitted earlier in order to focus on the
situation in which a consumer necessarily would purchase from
some firm. Salop recognizes that if gross consumer surplus is
positive but finite, then above a certain price a consumer will not
purchase from a producer even if price plus transport costs would be
higher from all other producers.73 If we assume that all consumers
have the same gross consumer surplus, as Salop does, then there
72. Cf RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF
ECONOMIC LIFE 107-21 (1992) (describing the tendency of people to make spending decisions
based on mental budget accounts).
73. Salop also considers a third possibility, that a price could be so low that a firm not only
would receive all of the consumers between it and its neighbor, but also half the consumers
on the other side of its neighbor. Salop labels this price threshold, which produces a
discontinuity in the demand curve, the "supercompetitive" price. Salop, supra note 39, at 143.
The intuition is that if one firm's price is sufficiently low that it will attract customers who
are located directly at its neighbor, it will also attract customers who are a bit farther. If it
makes sense for someone at the neighbor to travel all the way to the firm, then, given linear
transaction costs, once a customer a bit further away arrives at the neighbor, it makes sense
for that consumer to travel in addition the same distance that a customer initially located at
the neighbor traveled. The supercompetitive price, however, is not an equilibrium, as the firm
that loses all of its consumers would have an incentive to lower its price.
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will be some price threshold above which each producer in effect has
a monopoly market and faces a monopoly demand curve. Salop
calculates the price and the number of firms that enter the market,
subject once again to a zero profits constraint.74 The price margin is
slightly lower than in the competitive equilibrium, because when
gross consumer surplus is low, high prices will lead some consumers
not to purchase at all. The number of firms that enter the market is
therefore slightly lower as well.75 The number is nonetheless still
greater than the optimal number of firms.76
Salop's model, with prices in the monopolistic range, is uninter-
esting for our purposes because there is no competition between
products.77 As soon as gross consumer surplus is low enough that
some consumers are outside both nearby firms' potential monopoly
markets, there is no consumer who would even consider anything
other than the most closely located firm. This strange result stems
from the assumption that all consumers have the same gross
consumer surplus. This brings us to the third modification sug-
gested above, the possibility of a consumer who will purchase the
product only if its price is sufficiently low. Realistically, regardless
of whether there are consumers who will not purchase from anyone
because of high transport costs, there will also be consumers with
low transport costs who simply might decide not to enter the
market. By focusing exclusively on transport costs, Salop's model
ignores this type of heterogeneity among consumers.
74. Id. at 145-48.
75. Intuitively, the existence of consumers who may or may not purchase a product has
two effects on entry. The first is that the reduction in gross consumer surplus for these
consumers makes them less likely to make a purchase for a given price, and the corresponding
reduction in profits makes entry less attractive. The second is that price will fall because
firms will not want to risk the possibility of losing consumers, and so entry again becomes less
attractive.
76. Salop, supra note 39, at 152. The number of firms will be in between the monopoly and
competitive level if the equilibrium price is such that each producer's region of potential
monopoly demand, that is consumers who would purchase from that firm in the absence of
other firms, just touches those of its neighbors. Id.
77. The comparison of the number of firms that will enter with monopolistic pricing to the
number that optimally would enter is of apples and oranges, because the latter number is the
number that optimally would enter given that the entire market is to be served. If the
consumers immediately between two firms will not make purchases because gross consumer
surplus is less than transport costs, then each firm has monopoly power over all its potential
consumers. If this would also be true with one more firm in the market, then each firm would
still have monopoly power over all its potential consumers, and there would be no business
stealing effect from additional entry. At least until entry is sufficient so that all consumers
are covered, any entry up to this point necessarily must be welfare-improving, given the
assumption that all firms are equally spaced after entry. Therefore in a model like Salop's,
but without consumers whose gross consumer surplus is high enough that they plausibly
might purchase from either of two firms, entry will be insufficient.
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It is straightforward how this type of heterogeneity might lead to
insufficient entry rather than to excessive entry. Suppose that
consumers remain uniformly distributed about the circle, but there
is also some random distribution of gross consumer surplus from
purchasing a unit of the product around the circle. The number of
consumers who will purchase the product will then depend on the
price, and some consumers who value the product at above marginal
cost will decide not to purchase the product if the price is too high.
We have seen that increased entry decreases the equilibrium price
level by increasing competition,"8 and it will also have the effect of
increasing the total number of consumers who purchase the product
and receive consumer surplus. In contrast to the Salop model, entry
increases gross consumer welfare. The marginal entrant, however,
does not fully take this effect into account, caring only about the
fraction of consumers who otherwise would not have purchased a
product and now purchase from this firm. The inability of firms to
internalize the price effect thus produces a tendency toward
underentry.
This tendency toward underentry competes with the business-
stealing effect, with an indeterminate consequence for net social
welfare.79 There could be too few firms in the market under this
model, however, only because prices are too high from a social
perspective. Allowing entry is an expensive means of achieving price
reductions. If a price control could be administered efficiently, a
greater number of consumers could be served without incurring
these fixed costs. Although governmental experience suggests that
direct price controls are administrative nightmares,"° there are
other means of reducing prices besides price controls and increased
entry. This is especially so in markets for copyrighted products,
where a broad allowance of copying will reduce both entry and the
78. See supra text following note 47.
79. The balance would depend on the distribution of potential consumers' gross surplus.
If there are many potential consumers who would have purchased the product at a price a bit
lower than the equilibrium price, the underentry effect may be greater than the business-
stealing effect. There would have to be a fair number of such consumers, however. All of these
consumers receive relatively low consumer surplus from the product, because they are low-
valuing consumers. Given that the business-stealing effect leads to twice as much entry as
is socially optimal in the Salop model, the number of these consumers would have to dwarf
the number who would have purchased anyway for the benefits of additional entry to
dominate the business-stealing effect. Moreover, even some consumers whose gross consumer
surplus is greater than the reduced price may not purchase the product because of transport
costs. Consumers whose gross consumer surplus would be below the price even with
additional entry, meanwhile, receive no benefit from additional entry.
80. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Constitutional Limits on Physician Price Controls, 21
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 635,637-38 (1994) (discussing the potential administrative challenges
associated with health care price controls).
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average price that consumers will pay for the product, counting a
price of zero for those who copy.81
2. Additional Modifications
The possibility of variability in gross consumer surplus is the
most obvious and perhaps most significant modification to the Salop
model. There are, however, a variety of other modifications that
might make the model more realistic. This section will briefly
consider several such possibilities. My purpose is not to exhaust the
range of ways in which reality is more complicated than Salop's
model, but rather simply to identify a few significant additional
complications that could lead to underentry or optimal entry
rather than excessive entry. This discussion is useful, lest readers
conclude that overentry is inevitable and that any policies that
reduce entry are necessarily welfare-improving. There are two
reasons not to focus too much on the modifications that would be
needed to perfect Salop's model. First, there are radically different
industrial organization models that are also relevant to whether
there is inadequate or excessive entry, and I will briefly discuss
these to place Salop's model in economic context. Second, as shown
above, 2 policies that reduce entry may improve welfare even when
there is not excessive entry initially. In the next section, I will
return to this point, using a simulation analysis to demonstrate it
more rigorously.
The Salop model is of products aligned along a circle, but, as
suggested above, product characteristics rarely seem to fit along a
81. A fanciful example will help make the point. Let us assume that the Salop model
accurately reflects the dynamics of a particular market, except that variations in gross
consumer surplus make the existing number of firms optimal under rules that allow each firm
to charge whatever it wants. Suppose that the government promulgates a new policy that
firms can charge only marginal cost to citizens with even-numbered license plates, and
suppose further that firms comply costlessly and that consumers do not engage in arbitrage.
Recall that price in the Salop model is invariant to the number of consumers. See Salop, supra
note 39, at 148. Firms would charge approximately the same amount as before to citizens with
odd-numbered license plates. Social welfare, however, unambiguously rises. Although the
transfer from producers to consumers who would have made purchases anyway is irrelevant
to the social welfare calculation, consumers with gross consumer surplus between the
marginal cost and price now would receive the good if they had even-numbered license plates.
The social welfare calculation must also take into account the consumers' increase in
transport costs and the producers' increase in fixed costs associated with the decreased
number of firms, but the Salop model already shows that this trade-off would increase social
welfare. Although it reduces entry below the point that was optimal in its absence, the license
plate policy both increases the number of consumers who receive a product and achieves a
better balance between the fixed cost of entry and consumers' transport costs.
82. See supra Part I.B.1.
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circle.8 A slight improvement, albeit one that would be mathemati-
cally intractable, would be for producers to arrange themselves in
two-dimensional space, for example in a checkerboard pattern. Even
such a modest change could have significant implications for Salop's
model. 4 Along the circle, each producer faces competition from only
two neighbors, but in two-dimensional space, a producer competes
with at least four neighbors. Conceivably, this increase in competi-
tion might lead to a lower price margin, and thus to reduced entry.
The problem becomes even greater if producers are evenly arranged
in three-dimensional space, and greater still in n-dimensional space.
Products differ across countless dimensions, as attested by long lists
of product characteristics that often accompany advertisements.
Copyrighted works exist with no less diversity, although their
characteristics may not be subject to equally objective measurement
and reporting.
An additional, significant modification must be relaxation of the
assumption that firms are all equally spaced from one another.
Relaxation of this assumption makes derivation of a symmetric
equilibrium impossible, because firms' pricing decisions would
depend on the distance of other firms to them. It may at first appear
to be harmless, because some firms would end up charging more,
and others less, with no inherent bias that would affect entry. The
assumption, however, can have significant consequences when entry
is sequential rather than simultaneous. In Salop's model, all firms
enter at once, or, alternatively, when a new firm enters, all firms
reposition themselves so that equal spacing is retained.85 In reality,
repositioning is likely to be impossible or at least expensive, and the
wide product space between existing firms may produce what the
literature has termed entry deterrence.' For example, if the
equilibrium number of firms in Salop's model is seven with auto-
matic repositioning, but the model is then adjusted to allow for
sequential equilibrium without repositioning, then only four firms
will enter, because a fifth would have to position itself between two
of the existing firms and thus capture only one-eighth of the market.
83. See supra text following note 42.
84. For an article considering the extent to which the overentry result can be generalized
to higher dimensions, see Robin Hanson, Location Discrimination in Circular City, Torus
Town, and Beyond (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Hanson concludes
that "[olverall, too much entry seems a more severe problem than too little." Id. at 1.
85. Salop, supra note 39, at 145 n.3.
86. See, e.g., Giacomo Bonanno, Location Choice, Product Proliferation and Entry
Deterrence, 54 REv. ECON. STuD. 37, 37-38 (1987) (explaining entry deterrence); Jonathan
Eaton & Henryk Kierzkowski, Oligopolistic Competition, Product Variety, Entry Deterrence,
and Technology Transfer, 15 RAND J. ECON. 99 (1984) (constructing a model incorporating
entry deterrence).
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A final variable is quality. The Salop model assumes that
products are homogeneous except as to their location in product
space, but products may differ in ways that do not affect their
position in product space. For example, there could be a range of
Indian vegetarian cookbooks, with some that are simply better than
others, with the best perhaps featuring color photographs, large
numbers of recipes, and endorsements from the best chefs. Consum-
ers are likely to sort themselves according to their gross consumer
surplus, with the highest-valuing consumers choosing the products
of the highest quality and the highest prices, and lower-valuing
consumers choosing products of lower quality and lower prices."7
This is known in the literature as vertical price differentiation, with
the differentiation in product space that we have considered so far
known as horizontal price differentiation." The existence of quality
variations might increase entry, by giving each firm less competi-
tion, but it also might decrease entry because firms that otherwise
would be able to attract low-valuing consumers may expect to lose
these consumers to cheap alternatives. Quality variations also
complicate the notion of optimal entry, as there would not be just an
optimal number, but also an optimal range of quality among those
entrants.8 9 It is possible that a reduction in the number of copy-
righted works might produce an increase in quality, as the author
of each work will invest more to capture a larger market,' though
it is also conceivable that product diversity might spur quality
improvements.
In the end, possible extensions to the Salop model may be of less
concern than the possibility of wholly different models. Indeed,
87. Such sorting may not occur in markets for all copyrighted works. The price of
admission to movies, for example, seems invariant to their quality. This is a somewhat
mysterious phenomenon: Why don't movie theaters charge less for unpopular movies, just as
they charge less for unpopular times? Even more puzzlingly, why don't theaters charge less
for Tuesday night than they do for Saturday night? See Meurer, supra note 12, at 67-68.
Perhaps theaters believe that such pricing would offend consumers, or perhaps they worry
about the signaling effect, as low prices might make consumers reconsider movies that they
were interested in but turned out to be priced cheaply.
88. SIMON P. ANDERSON ET AL., DISCRETE CHOICE THEORY OF PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION
305-07 (1992). The literature also offers models in which all firms offer products of the same
quality, considering whether quality is too high or too low. Id. at 238-46. For a study
illustrating a connection between horizontal and vertical price discrimination, see Helmuth
Cremer & Jacques-Franqois Thisse, Location Models of Horizontal Differentiation: A Special
Case of Vertical Differentiation Models, 39 J. INDUS. ECON. 383 (1991).
89. For a study describing how lack of consumer information might lead to an increase in
the quality of goods, see Michael H. Riordan, Monopolistic Competition with Experience Goods,
101 Q.J. ECON. 265 (1986).
90. See, e.g., Haddock & Polsby, supra note 37, at 350-51 (making such an observation in
the radio programming context).
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there are countless theoretical models of product differentiation,
with the Salop model belonging to the family of spatial models,
sometimes also called address models or locational models. Perhaps
the most significant alternatives to these models are representative
consumer models, with a seminal contribution by Avinash Dixit and
Joseph Stiglitz.91 Instead of placing differentiated products in
product space, these models take the simpler approach of assuming
that consumers have a taste for product diversity. As Dixit and
Stiglitz explain, "a consumer who is indifferent between the
quantities (1,0) and (0,1) of two commodities prefers the mix(1/2,1/2) to either extreme."92 The models conclude that although
there could be excess entry, there also could be insufficient entry.
The intuition is that the taste for product diversity produces a
counterweight to the business-stealing effect, but the precise
balance is left uncertain.9' A producer cannot capture the entirety
of the increase in consumer surplus attributable to the additional
diversity that the producer's product provides, but also does not take
into account that some of its business comes from its competitors.
Representative consumer models thus advance the principal
argument of this Article: because of the business-stealing effect, one
cannot assume that increased incentives to produce copyrighted
works are necessarily beneficial. These models have, however, been
subject to considerable criticism. John Pettengill, in particular,
questioned the general applicability of the assumption that all
consumers consume some of each product. Indeed, the models seem
least applicable to markets for some types of copyrighted works.
"Some people do consume a large number of movies," Pettengill
points out. "But very few consumers see all the movies available.
And seeing half of twenty movies is not preferable to seeing all of
ten movies .... 94 Models of product diversification applicable to beer
or perhaps even to music thus might be less appropriate for movies
or books. Dixit and Stiglitz reply that their model does not necessar-
ily require individual consumers to consume a bit of each good, as
long as variety turns out to be sufficiently desirable for society as a
whole.95 Archibald, Eaton, and Lipsey, however, question whether
91. Avinash K Dixit & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Monopolistic Competition and Optimum
Product Diversity, 67 AM. ECON. REv. 297 (1977).
92. Id. at 297.
93. For a useful explanation, see TIROLE, supra note 44, at 288.
94. John S. Pettengill, Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity:
Comment, 69 Am. ECON. REv. 957, 959 (1979).
95. "As we clearly stated what is at issue is the convexity of Samuelsonian social
indifference curves, and that can arise just as easily (and probably more commonly) because
different consumers use different product types." Avinash K Dixit & Joseph E. Stiglitz,
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the assumption that Dixit and Stiglitz make will hold in the absence
of consumers each consuming some of each product. 6 More signifi-
cant for our purposes, they argue for the general superiority of
address models over representative consumer models on the ground
that the latter have explicit microeconomic foundations. A virtue of
such foundations is that they allow for simulation modeling
contingent on different parameters for consumers, producers, and
product space, a task to which this Article will now turn.
3. A Simulation Study
To consider how variations in the Salop model might affect
whether there is overentry or underentry in a particular market, I
designed, programmed, and executed a simulation study. The
simulation allows consumers randomly distributed in product space
to make purchasing decisions (or choose not to purchase any
particular good), and allows producers, who are also randomly
distributed in product space, to adjust prices to maximize their
profits. By calculating consumer and producer surplus in iterated
runs with sets of parameter values, we can determine the equilib-
rium and socially optimal levels of producer entry. The purpose of
this simulation is not to determine whether there is overentry or
underentry in any particular real market. Although industrial
organization scholars have begun to perform empirical studies that
assess the optimality of entry in various markets,97 these studies are
generally not based on simulation models. The parameter values
that I plugged into the simulation model are not based on actual
empirical studies, but the simulation nonetheless helps to test
whether overentry is indeed possible with a model richer than the
Salop model and whether permitting copying can increase social
welfare.
The result of the simulation is reported in full in the Appendix.
There are several points, however, that are worth summarizing
here. First, depending on the parameter values, both overentry and
underentry can occur in a market. Although this point challenges
the complacent neoclassical assumption that entry into copyrighted
markets is necessarily welfare-increasing, it also establishes that we
Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity: Reply, 69 AM. EcON. REv. 961,962
(1979).
96. G.C. Archibald et al., Address Models of Value Theory, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN TnE
ANALYSIS OF MARKET STRUCTURE 3, 14-16 (Joseph E. Stiglitz & G. Frank Mathewson eds.,
1986). For a discussion, see ANDERSON ETAL., supra note 88, at 131-32.
97. See infra Part III.
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cannot assume that overentry is pervasive. Second, the simulation
model helps illustrate the potential effects of business stealing.
Additional entry by producers into the market consistently in-
creased consumer surplus, but at a declining rate; the more works
that already exist in a particular market for copyrighted works, the
less any new work is likely to contribute to consumer welfare. Third,
excess entry is more likely with low marginal cost, and insufficient
entry is more likely with high marginal cost. This helps explain why
a consideration of business stealing is particularly important in the
intellectual property context. Fourth, even when entry is optimal,
the increased availability of technology allowing consumers to copy
rather than purchase works may increase social welfare. Above a
certain point, however, copying may become sufficiently widespread
that the depressive effect of copying will lower total welfare.
II. ADDITIONAL ECONOMIC AND NONECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
A. Other Economic Considerations
The Salop model and other models of product differentiation
assume that social welfare is simply the sum of producer and
consumer welfare. This Part considers two sets of arguments
against any policy that would discourage, or do less to encourage,
entry into copyright markets on grounds that social welfare is more
complex than that. The first set of arguments is that distributional
considerations might provide an argument for increased entry, and
the second is that externalities might justify such entry. I address
these arguments in part to challenge and refine the economic
models on which this Article has relied, but more importantly to
show how these models can challenge and refine existing scholar-
ship. I will argue that negative consequences attributed to winner-
take-all markets should more accurately be ascribed to demand
diversion in markets for copyrighted works,9' and that the recent
suggestion that copyright markets might be subject to congestion
externalities analyzes the problem too narrowly.9
1. Distribution
Wealth maximization is a central concern of positive economic
analysis, and some argue that it should in fact be the sole concern."
98. See infra Part II.A.l.b.
99. See infra Part II.A.2.b.
100. See RICHARD A. POSNER THE ECONOMICS OF JuSTICE 76-79 (1981). But see Jules
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Yet other economists, as well as legal scholars with non-economic
orientations, are willing to consider and evaluate the distributive
implications of market arrangements.'0 ' So far, I have labeled entry
excessive when it does not maximize social welfare, but I have
adopted the anodyne assumption that social welfare is simply the
sum of consumer and producer welfare. We might, of course, care
more about one of these categories than the other, and we might
also care about distribution in ways that cut across these categories.
This section evaluates this distributional axis as well as two more
subtle issues associated with distributional concerns. One of these
is the possibility that in some copyright markets, a small group of
top performers might obtain almost all of the producer welfare, an
issue with distributive and other implications. The second is the
possibility that copyrighted works and other economic products may
be "positional goods," desired not just for their intrinsic value, but
also as weapons in an arms race in the social hierarchy.
a. Producers vs. Consumers
The fixed costs incurred by producers of copyrighted works are
central to the thesis that excessive entry is possible. If it took no
time or money to produce a copyrighted work, then the possibility
of business stealing would have no welfare consequences, leaving
only the distributional issue of established producers versus
newcomers. When there are fixed costs to enter the market-the
price of writing, editing, and publicizing a book, for example-
business stealing can no longer be a matter of indifference, because
such demand diversion makes it possible that someone will have an
incentive to enter even if the total social benefit of entry is less than
the fixed cost. This focus on fixed costs cannot be dismissed as
reflecting a paternalistic interest in the welfare of producers. The
problem is a classic tragedy of the commons, and the legal obstacles
to self-regulation make the dilemma difficult to overcome. It might,
however, seem that concern about the interests of producers is
misplaced, that copyright law ought to focus solely on maximizing
consumer welfare. We encourage production, the argument goes,
because we value consumption. Additional entry can only enhance
Coleman, The Normative Basis of Economic Analysis: A Critical Review of Richard Posner's
The Economics of Justice, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1115-17 (1982) (book review) (critiquing
Posner's focus on wealth maximization).
101. Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell stress that distributive concerns are potentially
relevant to welfare economics, broadly conceived. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell,
Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REv. 961, 989-98 (2001).
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price competition and consumer choice, therefore, it ought to be
embraced, regardless of the effect on producers.
There is no reason in economics or philosophy to exclude the
interests of producers altogether. The debate between natural law
and utilitarian approaches to intellectual property is sometimes
framed in such a way that it may seem to be a debate about whether
the law should care about artists' rights or those of consumers.
Against that framework, concern about overentry might seem to
reflect an antique advocacy of the former. Although just as properly
conceived natural law theories of intellectual property take into
account the concerns of consumers, 10 2 so too should utilitarian
theories take into account value to producers. Economic advocates
of strong property rights in intellectual property have paid little
direct attention to the interests of producers. In the absence of
concern about business stealing, there is no need to worry about
producers per se, because in a simplified industrial organization
framework, the marginal producer will serve a marginal consumer
who otherwise would have been unserved and will make zero profit
from doing so.
That the interests of producers should receive weight in a
utilitarian calculus does not mean that each dollar of surplus should
count the same for both producers and consumers. One argument
for counting consumer welfare more than producer welfare would be
that consumers are generally less wealthy than producers. Virtually
all viewers of the latest Star Wars episode will have fewer material
resources than George Lucas, but many consumers of copyrighted
works seem like poor candidates for distributional concern. Distrib-
utive justice would seem to demand more concern for those who
cannot afford movies and books than for those who own substantial
compact disc collections. Moreover, media conglomerates are
generally publicly owned, and so the same middle class individuals
may have an interest in copyright policy as both consumers and
producers via their stock portfolios. That is not to say that the
average recipient of a dollar in producer profits is no more wealthy
than the average consumer paying such a dollar. It does, however,
suggest that if copyright policy is to be used to advance the goals of
distributive justice, the changes will have to be targeted carefully to
help consumers who are most in need of assistance.'03
Even if producers were to receive no consideration at all in a
welfare calculus, the fixed costs that they incur are still worth
102. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 4, at 1555-60 (discussing the public's entitlements to
intellectual property).
103. See infra Part III.B.1.
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considering, because we have seen that legal policy can shift rents
from one group to another. Even if consumers are always better off
with additional entrants, all else being equal, they might still be
better off if a tax reduced the number of entrants and were trans-
ferred to consumers. The possibility of redistributive taxation is a
common argument for placing wealth maximization as a central
objective of law outside the domain of policies primarily designed to
achieve distributive goals.'" A limitation of such an argument is
that a tax may be difficult to implement, either for political or
practical reasons. The theoretical possibility of a tax on movies,
books, or music does not answer the distributive concern if no
legislature would enact it.
More realistically, legal doctrine might change to give greater
rights to consumers at the expense of producers, for example, by
giving consumers greater rights to make copies of copyrighted
works."°5 Even if consumers suffer from the decreased diversity
attributable to a reduction in the number of producers, their overall
welfare depends on how that reduction is achieved. If the legal
vehicle for reducing the number of producers is a change in the law
that is generally favorable to consumers with respect to works that
are produced, then the benefits to consumers from this change
might be greater than the costs to them from decreased diversity. In
that case, even though the focus of this analysis is on producers'
losses, one could offer no distributional complaint on behalf of
consumers.
b. Winner-Take-All Markets
Though the producer-consumer axis is the most obvious along
which to evaluate distributional issues, distribution within each of
these groups is also of concern. This section addresses distribution
among producers, while the next considers distribution among
consumers. Authors, musicians, artists, actors, and other contribu-
tors to copyrighted works do not form monolithic groups. In each
104. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor?
Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL
STuD. 821, 822-25 (2000); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less
Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STuD. 667, 677 (1994)
("[1I]t is appropriate for economic analysis of legal rules to focus on efficiency and to ignore the
distribution of income.....). But see Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Solutions to the Intractability
of Distributional Concerns, 33 RuTGERs L.J. 279, 294-318 (2002) (criticizing the argument);
Chris William Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More
Equitable View, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 797 (2000) (same).
105. See supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
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category, some are far more successful than others. There can be no
more than one Oprah, Britney Spears, Thomas Kinkade, or Keanu
Reeves, and only a few who enjoy comparable success at the top of
their fields, financially at least, whether or not on the basis of any
intrinsic merit. There can, however, be many, many starving
wannabes, waiting tables part-time to eke out a living. The primary
concern here will not be with whether the distribution of rewards
among such beneficiaries of copyright protection is fair. Rather, it
will be how a market structure in which a few participants make off
with large rewards affects the analysis of overentry. Equally
significant, I will show how an appreciation of overentry should
prompt a reconceptualization of economic theories concerning
asymmetric distribution of rents among producers.
The implications of "winner-take-all markets," which perhaps
more accurately should be dubbed "winners-take-an-awful-lot
markets," are explored in Robert H. Frank and Philip J. Cook's The
Winner-Take-All Society.'" The book explores a wide variety of
markets-including professions ranging from academics'17 to
athletics.' Labor markets for producers of copyrighted works
receive some attention in the book, for example in the perhaps
overheated observation that "[book publishing is a lottery of the
purest sort, with a handful of best-selling authors receiving more
than $10 million per book while armies of equally talented writers
earn next to nothing.""° Similarly, they observe that in the arts and
entertainment fields, "only about 2 percent (16,000 people) earned
$120,000 or more in 1989. " n ° Yet their primary concern, like mine,
is not the fairness of this inequitable distribution but rather its
effects on decisions whether to enter the markets in the first place.
A central component of the thesis of The Winner-Take-All Society
might initially seem superficially similar to that advanced here.
"[Plotential contestants in winner-take-all markets," Frank and
Cook observe, "generally ignore an important cost imposed on others
by their entry-namely, that each additional contestant reduces the
odds that someone already in the contest will win.""' The result is
an excess of contestants in winner-take-all markets." Frank and
106. ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SocIETY (1995).
107. See, e.g., id. at 11-14.
108. See id. at 29-30.
109. Id. at 9. 1 say "overheated" because of my assessment, which is consistent with most
of the Frank-Cook argument, that the best-selling authors probably on average are more
talented, at least at producing what consumers want, than the relevant armies.
110. Id at 88.
111. Id. at 9.
112. Id. at 101-23.
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Cook realize that increased numbers of contestants will increase
quality, but they argue that "[i]f the least talented contestants were
to drop out and become engineers, teachers, or production workers,
the performance levels of the top performers in winner-take-all
markets would not fall by much, if at all.""' A lottery ticket that
offers a chance at superstardom may be worth more to some than a
predictable salary in a more stable profession, even if the social
value ofjoining the stable profession would be much higher than the
social value of having someone else try for stardom.
A consideration of the analysis in this Article, however, suggests
that Frank and Cook's identification of the excessive entry problem
with winner-take-all markets is too narrow. The winner-take-all
problem offers just a variant on the more general problem of
business stealing. It makes no difference to the analysis whether a
new entrant into the market diminishes other players' market share
or their probabilities of market dominance. Suppose that the market
for singers were far more equitable than it is now, perhaps because
consumers developed an affirmative distaste for familiar voices, so
each of thousands of singers sold a roughly equal number of compact
discs instead of a few top performers virtually cornering the market.
Each new entrant into this hypothetical singing market would still
be stealing business from other singers and would have no reason
to take this effect into account. As long as consumers can choose
among various producers, business stealing will tend to lead to
excessive investment regardless of whether the market is, or
approaches, winner-take-all.
Indeed, all else being equal, the excessive entry problem is likely
to be of greater concern in a market with relatively even payouts
than in a winner-take-all market. The reason is risk aversion.
People who are risk averse are by definition more hesitant to enter
a winner-take-all market than one with equal payoffs, and that will
lead fewer to enter such a market, dampening any excessive entry.
Frank and Cook offer a response to the argument that risk aversion
might reduce excessive entry in winner-take-all markets, albeit
without acknowledging the possibility that excessive entry might
not be unique to winner-take-all markets at all. They argue that
"[pirivate entrepreneurs can stimulate entry into winner-take-all
markets when it is insufficient,""' for example, by entering into
113. Id. at 109. A more accurate, though less dramatic, statement would be that if the
contestants who seem to be the least talented, based on their own evaluations or those of their
backers, drop out, the loss would not be great. It is always possible, however, that the party
dropping out would turn out to be extraordinarily successful.
114. Id. at 117.
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cooperative arrangements in which contestants agree to share their
winnings. Such arrangements, however, are likely to be beset by
adverse selection and moral hazard." 5 Even in the absence of these
obstacles, private entrepreneurship cannot fully offset risk aversion,
given the costs of organizing such cooperatives. There is no need for
such entrepreneurship in a market with more equitable distribu-
tion, and so, unless potential entrants are in fact risk-preferring as
a result of cognitive errors," 6 risk aversion will make winner-take-
all markets less susceptible to excessive entry than more equitable
markets, all else being equal.
Excessive entry cannot be a consequence of winner-take-all
markets, although I agree with Frank and Cook that, risk aversion
notwithstanding, it is more likely to be present in winner-take-all
markets than in other markets. The reason is that winner-take-all
markets typically exhibit low marginal production costs. Frank and
Cook recognize this association, and indeed they attribute the
increase in the number of such markets to "increasing leverage for
the talents of those who occupy top positions and correspondingly
less room for others to find a lucrative niche,""7 for example,
because a singer can perform in everyone's living room instead of
only a single location.' s The possibility of such "production
cloning""9 not only tends to make markets winner-take-all, but also
could make excessive entry a greater concern.
Low marginal cost may accentuate the business-stealing effect
because entry is unlikely to increase the number of consumers who
are served. When Yo-Yo Ma can be in everyone's living room, there
is less need to have dozens of other cellists than there would be in
the absence of audio recording, and business stealing accordingly is
less likely to have the side benefit of resulting in more consumers
being served. There is, to be sure, a competing effect. With low
115. The adverse selection problem is that those most likely to be winners are least likely
to enter into cooperative arrangements, and the moral hazard problem is that those who enter
into the cooperative arrangements will have less of an incentive to perform well. See generally
KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY
14-15 (1986) (defining "adverse selection" and "moral hazard").
116. Participants might be risk-preferring as a result of a self-serving bias. For discussions
of the self-serving bias, see David Dunning et al., A New Look at Motivated Inference: Are Self-
Serving Theories of Success a Product of Motivational Forces?, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 58 (1995); Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redietributive Legal
Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1659 & n.22 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen,
Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics,
88 CAL. L. REv. 1051, 1091-95 (2000); and Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About
Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 806 (1980).
117. FRANK& COOK, supra note 106, at viii.
118. Id. at 32-33.
119. Id. at 32.
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marginal cost, more consumers can benefit from each additional
entrant. In theory, all consumers can benefit from the thousandth
cellist in a world of audio recording. This effect, however, is likely to
dominate only when there are very few entrants. Though the
addition of a second cellist might substantially improve consumers'
welfare by allowing them to purchase compact discs of both
performers, once the number of cellists is sufficiently high, the
addition of a marginal cellist will not lead consumers to increase
their compact disc budgets, but instead will result only in substitu-
tion of the new cellist's work by some consumers for that of other
performers. Although it is possible that we are not at or near this
point in some markets for copyrighted works, the vast number of
available works in most markets provides some support for the
intuition that the optimal number of works will be lower with
relatively low marginal cost.
Frank and Cook's concern about redundant entry in winner-take-
all markets is well founded, although only because production
cloning may make markets both winner-take-all and susceptible to
business stealing, not because winner-take-all markets are inher-
ently susceptible to business stealing. This clarification has
significant implications for the scope of Frank and Cook's project.
Frank and Cook see winner-take-all markets almost everywhere,
yet their least persuasive examples are those in which the "produc-
tion cloning" protected by copyright law is not involved. For
example, they cite Alan Dershowitz as an example of a winner2 0
and law more generally as a winner-take-all field, 12' but the case
seems far weaker than in, say, music or athletics. Although some
lawyers undoubtedly earn far higher salaries than others, and some
rainmaker partners control a relatively large amount of business for
their firms, the scale of production is still considerably restricted
because any one lawyer can oversee only so many cases.1 2 Frank
and Cook claim that students enter law school because the educa-
tion gives them lottery tickets that might turn into multi-million
dollar jobs. 123 They offer no evidence for this assertion, however,
which seems inconsistent with the common intuition that, in
general, it is the most risk averse students who enter law school, in
120. Id. at 223.
121. Id. at 16-17. Frank and Cook emphasize that litigation services are offered in a zero-
sum game, but this is not a winner-take-all problem.
122. For an assessment of the degree to which the legal profession is winner-take-all, see
REBECCA L. SANDEFUR & JOHN P. HEINZ, WINNER-TAKE-ALL MARKETS FOR LEGAL SERVICES
AND LAWYERS'JOB SATISFACTION (Am. Bar Found., Working Paper No. 9906, 1999).
123. FRANK & COOK, supra note 106, at 97-98, 111.
20041
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
search of steady but unspectacular success. 12 4 Although microcosms
of the winner-take-all phenomenon may be pervasive, with the most
successful in every field from catering to construction earning
considerably more than other performers, Frank and Cook's
argument would be stronger if it were focused specifically on labor
markets producing copyrighted works, for low marginal cost is a
more significant contributor to the excessive entry problem than the
winner-take-all nature of markets. Although I may be more
skeptical than Frank and Cook that there will be overentry in such
markets, rather than entry that produces only a small amount of
social welfare, such a focus might have prompted attention to the
copyright trade-off between incentives and access, as considered in
this Article.
Frank and Cook's analysis, however, does highlight one important
feature of winner-take-all markets that is also likely to be present
in markets for copyrighted works and that supports this Article's
thesis: consumer welfare may depend greatly on relative perfor-
mance. Using boxing as an example, Frank and Cook argue that
although today's heavyweights likely are "a little faster and stronger
than the champions of earlier years," 25 this improvement has not
made the sport of boxing any better. "What most fans really care
about is seeing the best fighters in the game go all out for the
title,"26 so boxing today would not be much less attractive in a
parallel universe in which the top thousand fighters alive today had
instead decided to become chiropractors. Fans in the parallel
universe watching the boxers who they perceived to be the best
would be unaware of the potential loss to chiropractics. The game
would be almost as exciting as before, and chiropractics would gain
some of its strongest practitioners. It may similarly be the case that
consumers care about seeing the best new movie or hearing the hot
new musical group, rather than about the absolute quality of the
movie or group. Presumably, absolute quality matters in such
markets as well. 2 7 To the extent that relative performance does
matter, however, reductions in entry will have less of an adverse
124. A more plausible case of a winner-take-all market can be made for entry by recent law
school graduates into law firms. But see Kevin A. Kordana, Note, Law Firms and Associate
Careers: Tournament Theory Versus the Production-Imperative Model, 104 YALE L.J. 1907,
1908-09 (1995) (arguing that tournament theory fails to explain law firm organization).
125. FRANK & COOK, supra note 106, at 115.
126. Id.
127. Frank and Cook acknowledge that consumer concerns about absolute and relative
performance may coexist. See id. ("A buyer's satisfaction with his color television set ...
depends not only on the absolute quality of its pictures but also on how that quality compares
with other sets in use.").
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effect on consumer welfare and overentry--or alternatively, entry
that has only a small social value-is a greater danger.
c. Positional Goods
The winner-take-all market illustrates the possibility that
competition among producers to be the best might reduce social
welfare. Positional goods offer a similar dynamic among consumers.
A positional good is one that is valued because it is scarce and
consequently conveys status. 128 For example, I may want a red
Porsche convertible in part because I like the way the wind messes
up my hair when I drive at 100 m.p.h., but I might also like such a
convertible because my neighbor Jones will be impressed, or
perhaps even a bit jealous. The consumption of positional goods is
a matter of concern because consumption by one person inherently
makes someone else worse off. If everyone buys the same impressive
car for reasons other than inherent utility, then no one will be
impressed, and yet the result will be a Nash equilibrium129 because
in such a world, no one would want to be the only one without such
a car. Although, if everyone could agree to purchase a low-end
Toyota or Ford, everyone who otherwise would have purchased the
Porsche for positional reasons would be better off. More generally,
consumers will tend to excessively consume positional goods and
insufficiently consume nonpositional goods" ° because they do not
take into account the zero-sum nature of the positioning game.
An assessment of where copyrighted goods fit on the spectrum
from positional to nonpositional goods is relevant to the consider-
ation of the social value of marginal entrants into copyright
markets. The apparent benefit of increased entry is additional
consumer choice, and thus additional consumption of copyrighted
goods. If copyrighted goods were purely positional, then this
128. Robert Frank explains that the value of positional goods "depends relatively strongly
on how they compare with things owned by others." Robert H. Frank, The Demand for
Unobservable and Other Nonpositional Goods, 75 AM. ECON. REv. 101, 101 (1985). Fred
Hirsch, who originated the idea of positional goods, defined the term more broadly to include
those items that are inherently scarce, even if they are not desired for status alone. See FRED
HIRScH, SOCIAL LIMrs TO GRowTH 27 (1976). For example, we cannot all have full-time
human servants, because someone must be the servant, and so the services of such servants
may be defined as positional even though someone might want servants for reasons other
than status. See Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 19 (1992). I, for
one, would be embarrassed to have a butler, but I must admit that a butler would be
convenient when I feel like eating crepes but do not wish to get off the couch.
129. See supra text accompanying note 43.
130. See generally ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND (1985) (describing how
the quest for status leads people to compete for positional goods).
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additional consumption would have no social value, and the case for
reducing production incentives would be improved. Though the
precise degree of positionality is an empirical question, it seems fair
to intuit that copyrighted works have positional elements, but are
far from sports cars. Books especially serve primarily utilitarian
purposes, and although there are some collectors who take pride in
the diversity of their libraries, they are in the minority. Positional
aspects of books, however, are not altogether irrelevant. Many
people who purchase books never read them. Although that might
be in part because book purchases, like New Year's resolutions and
health club memberships, are often aspirational, it also might
reflect that ownership of a well-stocked library is a matter of pride.
Such a theory seems even more plausible with collections of compact
discs, movies, or computer games. Nonetheless, there are undeni-
able utilitarian, nonpositional advantages to owning collections that
require more than one shelf, chief among them reduction of boredom
from being repeatedly subject to the same work over and over again.
There are, however, three reasons that we should be concerned
about positional goods even if copyrighted goods are largely
nonpositional. First, even if consumers derive substantial utility
from nonpositional aspects of intellectual property, positional
aspects of such goods may be significant in explaining why consum-
ers choose one product over another. In particular, innovations in
copyrighted goods may be significantly positional even if the good
itself is largely nonpositional. Suppose, for example, that I want a
vegetarian cookbook for prosaic reasons, because I like to eat
eggplant when I go to restaurants but cannot figure out how to
make it taste good at home. Even so, the reasons that I might prefer
the newest cookbook with the most elegant cover to a heavily
discounted alternative might be positional. I might not really
believe that the newest cookbook is likely to instruct me how to
produce tastier eggplant than an older one, but as long as I am
buying a cookbook, I might as well buy a hip new one that will
complement the overall image that I am trying to project with my
kitchen. As the example shows, even a relatively small degree of
positionality can lead to significant excess production, because the
existing stock of copyrighted works often will be sufficient to satisfy
nonpositional utilitarian desires. Although this argument is
stronger for books than, say, for movies, even the average moviegoer
missed many movies with interesting trailers from the year before
and therefore it might seem that they ought to receive equal utility
from viewing an old one. Part of the success of the newest movies
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may be attributable to status associated with having seen the latest
movies.13'
Second, even if the underlying good is not positional, product
diversity may exist to satisfy positional desires. The economic
models of product diversity described above'3 2 posit a consumer
located in some ideal point in product space, but it may be that a
consumer's location in product space in fact depends on the location
of other consumers. A consumer, for example, might want to occupy
a unique niche in product space by purchasing a unique article of
clothing that no one else is likely to wear to the prom. Or, a
consumer may purchase an item because it is popular in a particu-
lar subculture with which the person wishes to identify. Though this
theory seems to have greater explanatory power in fashion than for
copyrighted works, the possession of unique or fashionable copy-
righted works might convey status. The analysis here is more
complicated than for classic positional goods, because the status
benefits are not necessarily detriments to others. To the extent that
product diversity brings relative status rather than improved
utility, however, consumers are likely to value it excessively from a
social perspective, and thus there is likely to be an excess of new
works.
Third, and most importantly, any reforms that would make
existing copyrighted goods more widely available to consumers
might tend to reduce the extent to which copyrighted goods are
positional. Imagine a world in which red convertibles could be
produced at very low marginal cost. If such red convertibles also
were sold at extraordinarily low prices, for example as indistin-
guishable knockoffs, then they would no longer be positional,
because there would be no status advantage to owning them. At the
same time, the population could obtain the nonpositional benefits of
such automobiles, such as superior handling. This is almost surely
a fantasy world, in part because it is difficult to imagine how one
might cheaply copy a car. A regime permitting noncommercial
copying of copyrighted goods, however, is feasible and it would make
intellectual property much less positional." Any remaining
positionality would be attributable to the status conveyed through
ownership of an authorized rather than an unauthorized copy. Any
131. Relatedly, preference for new movies relative to old ones may reflect a network effect,
because viewers want to see movies that others have seen recently to facilitate interesting
conversations. See infra note 152.
132. See supra Part I.
133. It might, however, enhance the positionality of devices capable of performing such
copying. See infra Part III.B.1 (noting possible adverse effects of a regime in which only some
consumers can afford copying devices).
20041
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
doctrinal change that would enhance access to intellectual property
at the expense of producers and of product diversity would counter-
act any tendency of consumers to invest excessively in copyrighted
goods for status reasons.
2. Externalities
The last section questioned the assumption that social welfare is
equal to the sum of producer and consumer welfare on the basis of
distributional consumers. This section questions that assumption
for the independent reason that social welfare also depends on
third-party effects. Perhaps my purchase of a book from you benefits
or hurts someone who is not a party to the transaction. The analysis
of winner-take-all markets and positional goods highlights specific
types of externalities, but the issue is far broader. This Article
cannot consider all possible externalities, and will, for example, pass
over the environmental effects of consumer consumption of books.
The most obvious type of externality from consumption of copy-
righted goods, the informational externality, might seem to push
toward underentry, but I will argue that copyright doctrine is an
odd place to take such an externality into account. In addition, I will
show how congestion externalities and network externalities
strengthen the case that overentry might occur.
a. Information Externalities
A book is not like a pizza. If you consume a pizza, there is almost
no conceivable cost or benefit to me, unless I have sold you the
pizza. A book, however, is not simply consumed, because books
teach, inform, and persuade. Some television programs do too, as do
some movies and music, though probably to a lesser degree. If a
copyrighted work changes you, then it may change how you interact
with me. A cookbook may improve someone's ability to cook, and
perhaps that person's guests will have an easier time not cringing
when complimenting the chef's cooking. Books may also serve as
reference sources or teaching tools in a variety of professions, and
the quality of products or services provided by those in such
professions will rise as a result of such uses, benefiting consumers.
More subtly, a work of fiction or a movie may change the way
someone thinks, perhaps by broadening the person's horizons in a
way that will lead the person to be more sympathetic to those from
different cultural backgrounds. Or, a computer game may warp a
child's mind and lead that child on a violent shooting rampage.
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The last of these would be a negative externality, while the rest
are positive externalities. The theory that a reduction in incentives
to produce copyrighted works would have negative third-party
effects depends on the positive externalities of marginal copyrighted
works being greater than the negative ones. This seems, on balance,
like a close question. Although the positive externalities of the
copyrighted works of any genre might well swamp the negative
externalities, the effects on the margins may point in the other
direction. Although marginal consumption of books might produce
more positive than negative externalities, marginal consumption of
movies, television shows, and music might produce more negative
than positive externalities. If television programming suddenly
became a bit less attractive, then the resulting decision of a
television viewer to watch less television rather than more seems
likely to lead that television viewer to spend more time on economic
and family pursuits. Even if the viewer is worse off, an effect which
is not an externality," others are likely to be better off, if affected
at all. I do not mean to suggest that third parties would be affected
at all, but if they were, it is hard to fathom how the effect for the
vast majority of copyrighted works would be more negative than
positive.
If information externalities are relevant, they probably will be
relevant only for a narrow class of copyrighted works. Garden
variety pop culture may well benefit society greatly, but the bulk of
the benefit is in entertainment value to the consumer, not in the
advancement of broader social welfare. This is a snobby position,
and I imagine that one might develop an argument that pop culture
is in fact an important shaper of social attitudes. 35 Although I am
skeptical that the effect tends to be more positive than negative, 36
I am still more skeptical that the effect is substantial enough to
merit significant concern about marginal changes in the volume of
entertainment harming anyone other than consumers of those
products. This still leaves works that are explicitly informative,
such as nonfiction books, television news, and law review articles,
for which there is a more plausible case of informational externali-
ties. Perhaps, one might argue, a copyright doctrine that encourages
the production of as many works as possible is worth it even if most
134. That the consumer might be worse off is, of course, a consideration that the Salop
model directly considers. See supra Part I.A.
135. For a work embracing commercially produced culture generally, see TYLER COWEN,
IN PRAISE OF COMMERCIAL CULTURE (1998).
136. A commonly alleged negative effect is the effect of television violence on children. See
generally John P. Murray, The Impact of Televised Violence, 22 HOFSTRA L. REv. 809 (1994)
(reviewing studies).
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copyrighted works are rubbish, because of the large beneficial
effects associated with informational works.
This argument has substantial merit, and indeed it explains my
intuition that many markets for copyrighted works probably do not
have socially excessive entry, but the argument can easily be
overstated. Even if informational works as a whole produce
substantial third-party benefits, marginal effects are unlikely to
matter much. Although I may benefit from your learning to cook, it
probably will not have much of an effect on me if you use a slightly
older cookbook rather than the newest one. Although the production
of history books promotes historical knowledge among the populace,
the level of the average person's historical knowledge is unlikely to
depend much on the range of new copyrighted works available to
that person. Of course, copyrighted works increase human knowl-
edge, so even if substitution effects mean that the marginal
production of one work has no effect on the average person's
knowledge, increases in the overall store of knowledge may be
significant. Copyright policy, however, is unlikely to be the best
vehicle for increasing the store of human knowledge; direct funding
of scientific and humanities research is a better tailored approach.
Similarly, even if increasing individuals' knowledge and awareness
is a social benefit, that social benefit is likely best achieved through
education spending rather than through copyright policy, even if
some of that education spending is used to purchase books and other
copyrighted works.
b. Congestion Externalities
The effect of informational externalities is on third parties who
need not be consumers of copyrighted works themselves. Congestion
and network externalities affect sellers and purchasers of related
copyrighted works. With a congestion externality, the existence of
too many copyrighted works of a particular type lowers demand
for that entire class of works. A congestion externality affects
consumers individually, whereas network externalities depend on
the interaction of consumers' consumption. A positive network
externality exists when one individual's consumption of a copy-
righted work increases the benefit to others of consuming that work.
In contrast, a negative network externality exists when one individ-
ual's consumption of a copyrighted work decreases the benefit to
others of consuming that work. This section considers congestion
externalities, and the next focuses on network externalities.
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Congestion externalities receive attention in William Landes and
Judge Posner's recent article urging that a regime of indefinitely
renewable copyrights replace the existing regime of time-limited
copyrights." 7 Their analysis of congestion externalities is important,
independent of their conclusion. Landes and Posner criticize a
suggestion of a group of intellectual property law professors that
"[tihere can be no overgrazing of intellectual property ... because
intellectual property is not destroyed or even diminished by con-
sumption."" 8 Adapting a similar observation by Mark Grady in the
right-of-publicity context,3 9 Landes and Posner suggest that
"congestion externalities" are possible with copyrighted works.
Explaining the trademark example, they write, "a celebrity's name
or likeness has public good characteristics ... yet unlimited repro-
duction of the name or the likeness could prematurely exhaust the
celebrity's commercial value, just as unlimited drilling from a
common pool of oil or gas would deplete the pool prematurely.""4
Just as Humphrey Bogart's value might decline if his name or
likeness in advertising were overused, so too might Mickey Mouse's
value, if, as a result of the absence of copyright protection, he
appeared in too many comic strips, advertisements, and movies.'
"Not only would the public rapidly tire of Mickey Mouse, but his
image would be blurred, as some authors portrayed him as a
Casanova, others as catmeat, others as an animal-rights advocate,
still others as the henpecked husband of Minnie." 42
Landes and Posner's argument provides some support for this
Article's observation that the number of copyrighted works may be
excessive, but the scope of the problem that they identify might be
quite small, and their focus on congestion obscures what I believe to
be a more general point about demand diversion. Landes and Posner
do not note the obvious, though insufficiently explored, point that
one producer's use of a copyrighted character will make some
customers likely to choose that producer over another. Rather, they
137. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHi.
L. REv. 471, 484-88 (2003).
138. Statement of Copyright and Intellectual Property Law Professors in Opposition toH.R.
604, H.R. 2589, and S. 505, 'The Copyright Term Extension Act,' 105th Cong. 9 (1998)
(statement of Dennis S. Kaijala, Law Professor, Ariz. St. Univ.), available at
http-J/homepages.law.asu.edu/-ndkarjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/legmats/1998State
ment.html (Jan. 28, 1998).
139. See Mark F. Grady, A Positive Economic Theory of the Right of Publicity, 1 UCLA ENT.
L. REV. 97 (1994); see also Douglas G. Baird, Does Bogart Still Get Scale?; Rights of Publicity
in the Digital Age, 4 GREEN BAG (2D) 357, 363-64 (2001).
140. Landes & Posner, supra note 137, at 487.
141. Id.; see also Baird, supra note 139, at 364.
142. Landes & Posner, supra note 137, at 487-88.
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argue that the absence of a property right might lead to lower
demand for the products of all producers, as they illustrate with a
demand curve that shifts down in response to the absence of a
property right."4 The theory goes that the value of Mickey Mouse
will be optimized over time by making him relatively scarce
initially, lest the "public rapidly tire"'" of him. Similarly, the value
of Mickey Mouse will be optimized by ensuring that his image is
kept sharp by resisting uses of him that might make him lose his
identity.
These are relevant considerations, but the empirics are difficult
to assess. Consider first the timing issue. It is possible that the best
way to ensure future interest in Mickey Mouse might be to make
sure that Mickey Mouse is omnipresent today. A purpose of
advertising is to build product recognition, and the widespread
presence of a product can be a profitable form of increasing market
share in the future. Alternatively, the future consumption of Mickey
Mouse might be so uncertain that the net value of the character is
maximized by full exploitation today. ABC Television executives
were surely aware of concerns that the public might tire of Who
Wants to Be a Millionaire?,"4 yet nonetheless filled the network's
schedule with Regis Philbin. Perhaps this is a cautionary tale, or
perhaps interest would have faded anyway and the network was
smart to snag ratings while viewers were interested, even if the
volume of programming decreased later interest in the show. The
point is not that the immediate exploitation strategy is necessarily
best, but simply that sometimes it might be.
The empirics are also uncertain even within a given time frame.
It is possible that an inundation of Mickey Mouse images might
increase the aggregate demand for such images. The exposure to my
successful film will help popularize the character and encourage
others to seek out everything Mickey, and additional production
conceivably could increase the demand curve. Even if my production
of a Mickey Mouse film hurts other producers of Mousiana, the
amount of business that I receive could be greater than the amount
of business that I take away from others. The presence of an
additional Mickey Mouse product will increase aggregate demand
for such products by allowing each customer to consume the product
most closely tailored to her interests. This is the logic of the product
differentiation literature, with differentiation making product space
143. Id. at 486 fig.1.
144. Id. at 487.
145. See, e.g., Bill Carter, At 3 Times a Week, Will ABC's Millionaire Show Be Too Much
of a Great Thing?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2000, at C1l.
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more dense, to the benefit of consumers. Landes and Posner's
scenario is empirically plausible, but in the ordinary course of
events, increased product diversity will have no effect, nor will it
increase aggregate demand rather than decrease it.
These observations, of course, do not diminish Landes and
Posner's recognition that a copyright owner will have appropriate
incentives, inundating the market in one case or manufacturing
scarcity by limiting use of a copyrighted work in another, and that
a property right may encourage optimal use of the resource. 1" If
scarcity across product markets or time maximizes the value of
intellectual property, then the absence of a property right mighi
lead to excessive use because no individual producer has an
incentive to take congestion externalities into account. The reality
of scarcity does, however, suggest that congestion externalities in
the form that Landes and Posner describe them are an unusual, or
at least not a pervasive, phenomenon. Landes and Posner's criticism
is a narrow one, targeted at copyright in characters and the like.147
Overdistribution of any particular copyrighted work seems less
likely to produce a congestion externality. Although I may be willing
to see It's a Wonderful Life only a certain number of times or may
not wish to see it for a year or so after I have last seen it,'48 it is
hard to believe that increased access to the production would
decrease my demand for it on the whole. Surely I will see the film
more if it is played often than if it is played seldom.'49
Congestion externalities, in any event, are unlikely to be a
significant factor producing a tendency toward excessive production
of works, because copyrighted works are far more economically
important than uncopyrighted works. This conclusion, however,
does not diminish the possibility of excessive production more
broadly, a possibility of which Landes and Posner take no account.
Indeed, in discussing congestion externalities, Landes and Posner
146. Property rights have long been understood to be important not only in providing
optimal production incentives, but also to encourage optimal current uses. See Landes &
Posner, supra note 137, at 484 & n.26 (citing Frank Knight, Some Fallacies in the
Interpretation of Social Cost, 38 Q.J. ECON. 582, 586-92 (1924)).
147. Id. at 486-87.
148. I mention It's a Wonderful Life because of the unusual state of its copyright. The work
appeared to fall into the public domain because of a failure by the owner of the film to observe
copyright formalities. The copyright owner, however, later argued that unauthorized
distribution of the film would infringe the copyright on the short story on which the film was
based and on the music in the film. See Steven Mitchell Schiffman, Movies in the Public
Domain: A Threatened Species, 20 CoLuM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 663, 671-72 (1996).
149. I do not mean to imply that a copyright owner would ensure that It's a Wonderful Life
will be on television every night. There are opportunity costs to broadcasting a show, and I
might prefer on some nights to see a rerun of Greatest Police Chases II.
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emphasize that "we must distinguish between technological and
pecuniary externalities," and they ignore the demand diversion
phenomenon. 5 ' As shown above, however, pecuniary externalities
can matter in circumstances of imperfect competition.". What
Landes and Posner miss is the significance of investments in
copyrighted works. Even if my decision to produce a new Mickey
Mouse film has no effect on aggregate demand, or even increases it,
the production may lower social welfare once the fixed costs of
producing the film are taken into account. Although Landes and
Posner recognize the possibility that congestion in product markets
on occasion may lessen consumers' interest in those markets as a
whole, they take no account of the social cost of producing the
congestion in the first place.
c. Network Externalities
Whereas the analysis of congestion focuses on individual consum-
ers confronted by a range of similar products, the network
externality analysis highlights the effects of one consumer's
consumption on another.'52 The analysis of network externalities is
particularly important in the software market, because one person's
decision to use a particular brand of software makes that software
brand more attractive to others.5 3 Network effects might exist to a
lesser extent with consumers of books, movies, or music. My
enjoyment of a book may depend in part on my ability to discuss it
with others, so your decision to read the same book as me will
produce a benefit to me. 54 If two torts professors assign the same
150. Landes & Posner, supra note 137, at 486.
151. See supra Part I.A.3.
152. I use the term "network externality" rather than "network effect" because I am
analyzing whether nonoptimal entry may occur as a result of the effect of one consumer's
consumption on another consumer. I recognize, however, that network externalities
sometimes can be internalized and that network effects need not inherently lead to
suboptimal outcomes. Some authors have suggested reserving the term "network externality"
for markets in which these externalities lead to inefficiencies. See, e.g., S.J. Liebowitz &
Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality:An Uncommon Tragedy, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 133,135
(1994).
153. For an analysis considering both software and other markets, see Mark A. Lemley &
David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998).
154. A book would thus be a solidarity good. Guy Pessach has recently used the
phenomenon of solidarity goods to argue that copyright law may discourage even non-
infringing works, particularly non-infringing works made by parties other than major media
companies, which may never reach consumers as a result of the dominance of major media
products. See Guy Pessach, Copyright Law as a Silencing Restriction on Noninfringing
Materials: Unveiling the Scope of Copyright's Diversity Externalities, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1067
(2003). In the terms of this section, the network benefits from solidarity goods may produce
a type of path-dependence that prevents the marketing of alternative works.
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casebook, students in different classes will find it easier to study
together. Similarly, the tendency of many moviegoers to see movies
as soon as the films arrive in theaters, rather than waiting for the
crowds to thin or the price to drop, suggests that these effects may
be important indeed. Finally, I may wish to exhibit familiarity with
the same music that others enjoy. 155
The increasing returns associated with network markets are, of
course, beneficial to the participants in these markets. There are,
however, at least two reasons that network externalities could lead
to inefficient outcomes. First, realization of positive network
externalities requires implicit coordination, and entrants into
markets may not fully take into account that their entry might
frustrate such coordination. Company A and Company B may
produce two incompatible word processing programs, and all
consumers would benefit if only they could settle on one company or
the other. Because the companies' products are so similar in quality,
the existence of rival programs may persist for a period of time,
limiting the positive network benefits that consumers can receive.
It is therefore possible that reduced rents to software companies
might improve the utility of software by reducing the number of
companies that decide to enter software markets. Analogous
phenomena, though not as powerful, occur in other media. If I see
movies because I like to discuss them with others, then the exis-
tence of a diverse array of movies may frustrate our attempts at
conversation. If two good movies are released one weekend, but you
and I each have time for only one and do not coordinate, then we
may end up seeing different movies. Even if each of us benefited
from the density of product space in the moviegoing experience
itself, that same density may limit our ability to share our experi-
ences. This consequence likely produces a tendency toward excess
production, but it should not be exaggerated. People, after all, often
do succeed in implicitly coordinating their behavior, as one movie,
perhaps because of hype or word-of-mouth, becomes a focal point." 6
Those who wish to discuss movies will see that specific movie rather
than some other movie.
Second, network externalities may contribute to path dependence.
The most popular example in the literature is the QWERTY
155. Of course, for the same reason, music might be characterized as a positional good. See
supra Part II.A. 1.c. Perhaps I invest in music to be in the cool crowd, but my investment may
harm others by diluting their relative coolness quotient. Stated purely in network externality
terms, network externalities that are positive because they cement in-group relations may
also be characterized as negative because of their effect on those outside the group.
156. See generally THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLIcT 54-58 (1960)
(discussing "tacit coordination" games where participants seek out a focal point).
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keyboard, which, though it is allegedly an inferior layout, is the
dominant standard.'57 Keyboard users are unable to switch to a
better standard because there are network benefits to using the
same keyboard as others, or so the story goes. The welfare implica-
tions might seem to point to the production of an insufficient
number of works, because a greater number of works may help
prevent path dependence. Any benefits from a reduced number of
works, however, come at the expense of network benefits. It seems
unlikely that a decrease in the number of works will increase
welfare by frustrating network effects. Perhaps it could happen in
a rapidly growing market because the welfare of the initial users
may be of much less significance than the welfare of subsequent
users. In such a market, however, an innovative product might be
able to overcome the network effects enjoyed by a dominant but
inferior product. In any event, path dependence is only a concern
with software, not with other copyrighted works. The network
externalities analysis on the whole supports this Article's observa-
tion that an excessive number of copyrighted works may be
produced.
B. Differentiation and Democracy
This Article focuses on the economics of copyright, but scholars in
recent years increasingly have focused on copyright through the lens
of democratic theory.58 Most prominently, Neil Netanel has
analyzed copyright's importance to democracy in a series of
articles,159 suggesting that copyright underwrites an expressive
157. The inferiority, however, may be exaggerated. See, e.g., S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E.
Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1990).
158. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891
(2002); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); Michael Birnhack, The
Copyright Law and Free Speech Affair: Making-Up and Breaking-Up, 43 IDEA 233 (2003);
Erwin Chemerinsky, Balancing Copyright Protections and Freedom of Speech: Why the
Copyright Extension Act is Unconstitutional, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 83 (2002); Niva Elkin-Koren,
Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic Approach to Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215 (1996); Andrew M. Hetherington, Constitutional Purpose and
Inter-Clause Conflict: The Constraints Imposed on the Commerce Power by the Copyright
Clause, 11 MicH. TELECOMm. & TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene
Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147,
189 (1998); Lawrence Lessig, Copyright's First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057 (2001);
Rubenfeld, supra note 4; Eugene Volokh & Brett McDonnell, Freedom of Speech and
Independent Judgment Review in Copyright Cases, 107 YALE L.J. 2431 (1998).
159. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Asserting Copyright's Democratic Principles in the Global
Arena, 51 VAND. L. REv. 217 (1998) [hereinafter Netanel, Global Arena] (assessing the
relevance of copyright to developing democracies); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a
Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283 (1996) [hereinafter Netanel, Democratic Civil
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sector and an independent press that play an integral role in
democratic governance. It might thus seem that even if economic
analysis suggests that overentry is likely to be a problem, these
concerns would be swamped by democratic considerations. I do not
question the importance of copyright to democracy, and many of
Netanel's recommendations for copyright doctrine are consistent
with an understanding of overentry. Nonetheless, I will argue that
democratic considerations, though relevant to the resolution of some
doctrinal issues, do not offer a strong challenge to a focus on
demand diversion. This is so for two reasons, which I will explain in
the two subsections that follow. First, the democratic and economic
interests underlying copyright are, for the most part, likely to be
aligned on issues of copyright policy. Second, to the extent these
interests diverge, there is reason to believe that a reduction in the
number of works would have as significant democracy-enhancing as
democracy-harming effects.
1. Democracy vs. Economics
Netanel suggests several related vehicles through which copy-
right fosters a democratic civil society. First, the dissemination of
copyrighted works is "a fundamental building block of democratic
association," facilitating "the exchange of information and ideas" in
associations of like-minded individuals."6  Second, copyright
promotes education, allowing "citizens to articulate their interests"
and draw upon existing knowledge and ideas. 161 Third, "public
communication ... serves as an independent, critical component of
civil society," providing "a locus of liberative discourse."1"2 Fourth,
copyright allows for "considerable independence from government
administrators and private patrons who would otherwise meddle in
expressive content."'6
Society] (presenting a comprehensive view of copyright's role in democratic governance); Neil
Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV.
1 (2001) (considering the appropriate First Amendment treatment of copyright law); Neil
Weinstock Netanel, Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our System of Free Expression, 53
VAND. L. REV. 1879, 1884 (2000) (arguing that concentration of media ownership may lead to
"the disproportionate power of wealthy speakers and audiences to determine the mix of speech
that comprises our public discourse"). For a critique of Netanel's work, and in particular of his
Market Hierarchy article, see Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Democracy: A Cautionary
Note, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1933 (2000). The focus here is on Netanel, Democratic Civil Society,
supra.
160. Netanel, Democratic Civil Society, supra note 159, at 348.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 349.
163. Id. at 352-53.
20041
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
As all of these points suggest, deliberation is integral to demo-
cratic governance, and copyrighted works play important roles in
such deliberation. The more difficult question is the extent to which,
in the absence of copyright, works that may otherwise be copy-
righted could serve much the same function. Democratic associa-
tions, for example, would have an incentive to communicate with
their members even if third parties could copy the associations'
newsletters. In a world without copyright, citizens would be at least
as free to draw upon existing works and ideas, albeit from a smaller
stockpile. Surely many forms of public communication would exist
even in the absence of copyright, and indeed politically motivated
speech might occupy a larger relative place, as profit is but one
motivation for the production of such speech. Because free speech
protection applies as much to uncopyrighted works as to copyrighted
ones, those who create such works enjoy the same legal independ-
ence, if not an equal ability to make a living by engaging in speech.
The volume of works on issues of public concern is so vast that even
if copyright were abolished, there would likely remain a very large
number of works to serve as foundations for democratic deliberation,
far more than any individual could read, even if a fraction of the
previous total. Academics and think tanks, after all, do not create
work primarily for profit, and some form of press would likely exist
even without copyright protection. 64
Of course, I do not mean to suggest that the world without
copyright would be better than the world with it. Netanel presents
a convincing argument that democracy would be relatively impover-
ished in a world without copyright, especially in emerging democra-
cies," and I suspect that democratic discourse would be far less
vibrant in the United States if speech were limited to those who had
a noneconomic motive to engage in it. The difficulty of establishing
an unequivocal democratic case for the existence of copyright at all
should make us suspicious of any doctrinal recommendations that
operate primarily on the margins. It is one thing to point out
copyright's importance to democracy, but it is quite another to
suggest that a marginal decrease in the number of works produced
would impinge upon democratic deliberation. The question is
whether economic and democratic considerations point in opposite
directions at the margins, and although Netanel seems to imply that
they might, his examples do not clearly demonstrate this.
164. Breyer, supra note 1, assesses the extent to which such first-mover advantages might
be sufficient.
165. See Netanel, Global Arena, supra note 159.
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Consider Netanel's discussion of the copyright term.' Netanel
argues that neoclassical economics "lends unreserved support to the
lengthened copyright term," because neoclassical economists believe
that "broad, fully transferable property rights are the best mecha-
nism for putting existing works of authorship to their most socially
valued uses."'67 As a result, Netanel writes, neoclassical economists
would favor copyright protection up to the point when the social
benefit of a copyrighted work is less than the cost of obtaining
permission for that work." The democratic paradigm, by contrast,
would "support a richer vision of the public domain," recognizing
that "works should at some point become a part of our common
cultural heritage because they have considerable social value, not
simply because of market failure."" 9 The democratic paradigm,
however, should have no preference between the private and public
domains as such. Rather, Netanel's analysis suggests that demo-
cratic theorists, like economists, should value both the production
of new works and the distribution of existing works. If the neoclassi-
cal economists are correct in seeing property rights as "putting
existing works of authorship to their most socially valued uses,"7 '
then Netanel's insistence that the works be placed in the public
domain nonetheless is perverse. Of course, the neoclassical econo-
mists might be wrong, but that is an argument on the economists'
own terms.' 71
Similarly, consider Netanel's position on "personal uses," such as
reading, listening to, or copying existing works, in the context of
digital works.'72 Netanel rejects, perhaps rightly so, both the
neoclassical economists' view that strong property rights in
copyright owners will "achieve efficient resource allocation" and the
minimalists' view that all free use tolerated in the hard copy world
should be allowed as well in cyberspace. 173 Netanel explains that
"the democratic paradigm eschews the neoclassicist principle," but
sees "no reason to cling to hard copy distinctions in the digital
166. I consider the copyright term further infra Part II.A.2.
167. Netanel, Democratic Civil Society, supra note 159, at 367-68.
168. Id. at 368 (citing Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 361-62).
169. Id. at 368-69.
170. Id. at 368.
171. Rubenfeld makes a similar point, though not directly in response to Netanel's
argument. See Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 21-22 ("If copyright law gets the economics right,
speech will be maximally incentivized, and copyright will therefore be constitutionally
unobjectionable. From this point of view, the policy analysis is the First Amendment
analysis.").
172. Netanel, Democratic Civil Society, supra note 159, at 371-76.
173. Id. at 372-73.
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network environment,"174 and further explains that "the democratic
paradigm would not support author and publisher appropriation of
a greater portion of the consumer surplus than is necessary to
support self-reliant and diverse authorship."'75 Netanel gives no
explanation, however, of why the amount "necessary to support self-
reliant and diverse authorship" should be different from the optimal
amount from an economic perspective. Indeed, the arguments that
he provides fall well within the ambit of traditional welfare
economics. For example, he claims that collective licensing organiza-
tions "are plagued by problems of monopoly power and pricing,"17 6
which are quintessentially economic problems. That these problems
have ramifications for democratic governance does not mean that
the democratic balance would be any different from the economic
one.
Netanel's argument might be stronger if he sought to identify
where economic interests and democratic ones diverge. Economics
is concerned with both the production of copyrighted works and
their distribution, and Netanel is right to emphasize that both the
production and distribution of copyrighted works are important for
democratic purposes as well. What he needs to show to make the
democratic paradigm significant is not that existing economic
arguments ignore or overemphasize distribution or production, but
that an aggregation of consumer and producer welfare is insufficient
to capture the social optimum. Perhaps copyrighted works have, in
addition to direct effects on the wealth and utility of consumers and
producers, third-party effects-for example, by enriching public
discourse even among those who have not purchased the work. If
this is so, then the balance that economics strikes on a particular
copyright issue between production and distribution might be
different from what democratic theory would strike. An economist
could correctly respond that this difference is just an example of a
market failure, but an advocate of the democratic paradigm could
retort that conventional economic tools offer no useful models for
understanding or combating such a failure.
Netanel comes closest to making an argument about third-party
effects in assessing the scope of the derivative right. "Given
copyright owners' propensity to private censorship and systematic
ability to demand supracompetitive license fees, copyright owners'
expansive control over transformative uses unduly stifles the
174. Id. at 373.
175. Id. at 375.
176. Id. at 376.
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creative reformulation of existing expression," Netanel argues.' v
His point about license fees is within the ambit of economics,
but the censorship point may not be. A copyright owner's
antidissemination motive may optimize consumer and producer
welfare at the expense of potentially useful expression,"7 and the
democratic interest in producing criticism sometimes may be
sufficiently strong to trump economic concerns about wasteful rent
dissipation. This is an important caveat relevant to particular
doctrinal issues,' but it cannot form the basis for a broader attack
on the point that there may be overentry in copyright markets. The
example is anomalous, because the production goal of maximizing
incentives to produce and the distribution goal of bringing a range
of copyrighted works to consumers are in alignment with each other,
though not necessarily with economic considerations more broadly.
The derivative right is thus a useful example of how democratic
considerations might matter, but it tells us little about how to
resolve cases in which both economic analysis and the democratic
paradigm seek to achieve some optimal trade-off between the
production and distribution goals. This Article's observation that the
production goal might in fact point in the other direction, suggesting
that the number of works may be in excess of the optimal number,
does not offer an escape from the dilemma. Many of the doctrinal
issues that Part I considered involve situations in which a change
would both decrease the number of works and increase distribution.
Even if democratic theorists would lament any decrease in the
number of works, the attendant increase in distribution might not
be worth it. Indeed, Netanel's emphasis on "diverse authorship""s
would suggest that he should be relatively indifferent about any
reductions in the number of works if indeed demand diversion is
pervasive.
Might a democratic theorist, however, offer an argument for
production over distribution? One might argue that the third-party
effects of copyrighted works are so great that production is far more
important than distribution. For example, one might argue that
critical commentary about the government has substantial value
independent of how widely it is distributed, because the most
177. Id. at 378.
178. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES, COPYRIGHT, BORROWED IMAGES AND APPROPRIATION ART
15 (Univ. of Chicago, John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 113, 2001) (noting that
copyright holders may voluntarily license transformative uses of their work only "if they
approve of the way their images are used"), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/
Lawecon/WkngPprs_101-25/113.WML.Copyright.pdf.
179. See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing parody).
180. Netanel, Democratic Civil Society, supra note 159, at 375.
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relevant decision makers are likely to read it. Such arguments seem
plausible, but they are merely another form of the informational
externality arguments that I have already addressed.' 8 ' The same
response is still applicable. If a policy goal is to increase human
knowledge, copyright seems an inefficient vehicle. The point,
however, becomes even clearer once we recognize the trade-off
between production and distribution inherent in most copyright
issues. Although we cannot eliminate the possibility that a different
resolution of this trade-off might be appropriate given a democratic
rather than an economic perspective, there is as yet no democratic
criterion that would allow us to assess which way the distinction
cuts. A reasonable presumption then is that democratic benefits are
roughly proportional to economic welfare. Perhaps a democratic
theorist might argue that producer surplus should be of less interest
than consumer surplus, but Netanel at least emphasizes the value
of a "self-reliant" productive sector. 82 In any event, as I have
argued, the attention that product differentiation pays to producer
surplus need not be out of concern for producers per se, because
policy levers may allow reallocation between producers and
consumers.
83
2. A Democratic Assessment of Production Incentives
Even if there were no trade-off between production of new works
and distribution of existing works in copyright law, there is
substantial reason to doubt that democracy would be impoverished
if there were fewer works, holding constant the distribution of
works. One reason is simply that most works do not matter much
for democracy. Democratic considerations are presumably more
important in some areas than in others, and copyright law explicitly
recognizes the particular importance of certain types of speech.'
Netanel asserts that copyright's role in democratic civil society is
applicable not only to works specifically concerning "matters of
political or social importance," but also to "creative works" and
"works of popular culture.""8 Art and popular culture are undoubt-
edly important democratic forces, but democratic considerations
181. See supra Part II.A.2.a.
182. Netanel, Democratic Civil Society, supra note 159, at 288.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 103-04.
184. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing fair use).
185. Netanel, Democratic Civil Society, supra note 159, at 350. Netanel explains, "[o]ur
public discourse ... is part entertainment, but as it entertains, it often reveals contested issues
and deep fissures within our society, just as it may reinforce widely held beliefs and values."
Id.
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seem less salient with respect to a college football broadcast than to
the publication of a news magazine that might reach approximately
the same number of people. Moreover, any attempt to assess
normatively whether the effects on culture of marginal changes in
copyright doctrine would be for better or for worse is impossible. It
does seem fair, though, to conclude that the effects would be small.
The public discourse was not obviously less "rambunctious" and
"effervescent" in the past than today,' even if the total number of
copyrighted works created annually was lower then. 7
Even with respect to works of obvious social or political import,
however, there is at least some reason to believe that public
discourse might improve if there were fewer copyrighted works. In
Republic.com, Cass Sunstein laments the potential of the Internet
to increase group polarization and lessen shared experiences.' 8
Increasingly, Sunstein observes, technology fuels "the growing
power of consumers to filter what they see."8 9 In a well-functioning
democracy, Sunstein argues, citizens have shared experiences and
are "exposed to materials that they would not have chosen in
advance.""9 Public forums ensure that "[pleople will get a glimpse,
at least, of the lives of others," as well as "of the arguments being
made by people with a particular point of view."' 9 ' In contrast, if
citizens' views are formed by encounters with others who are
initially like-minded, citizens are not only unlikely to change their
views, but "are likely to move toward a more extreme point in the
direction to which the group's members were originally inclined."92
This group polarization phenomenon presents the danger that too
many works may threaten democratic values. If liberals watch
CNN while conservatives watch Fox News, if liberals read the
186. Netanel uses these words to describe popular culture, but he makes no explicit claim
that the quantity of works has a meaningful effect on the quantity of public discourse. Id.
187. See supra text accompanying note 26. The one relevant caveat to this argument is that
the growth of the Internet has created an entirely new form of discourse. But the Internet too
seems to advance the case. Recent changes in the expanse of the Internet, whether as a result
of the dot-corn bust or as a result of the ever-increasing number of pages, may have made it
more useful, but hardly can be said to have made it a less powerful or productive cultural
force.
188. CAss SUNSTEiN, REPUBLIC.COM (2001).
189. Id. at 8 (emphasis omitted).
190. Id. at 8-9.
191. Id. at 33.
192. Id. at 65 (emphasis omitted). Sunstein has explored this phenomenon of "group
polarization" in several additional works. See, e.g., David Schkade et al., Deliberating About
Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1139, 1140 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein,
Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 74 (2000); Cass R.
Sunstein, Why They Hate Us: The Role of Social Dynamics, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 429,
429 (2002).
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Washington Post while conservatives read the Washington Times,
and if liberals listen to NPR while conservatives listen to Rush
Limbaugh, the chance for democratic interaction, let alone consen-
sus, declines. Neutral media, of course, would not solve the problem
entirely. Even independent of media influences, Robert Huckfeldt
and John Sprague have noted that Democrats tend to talk about
politics with other Democrats, while Republicans tend to talk about
politics with other Republicans.'93 As it becomes increasingly easy
to choose not only a form of media but also a particular channel or
publication, however, the problem conceivably could get worse.
Similarly, the more books that exist on education reform, the
environment, criminal justice, or any other topic, the greater the
chance that a reader will be able to find one that supports her
preexisting conceptions on the topic, however complex these
preconceptions might be.
I do not mean to conclude that a greater number of copyrighted
works necessarily harms democracy. Sunstein recognizes that one
reason that they might not is because "enclaves" of like-minded
individuals might produce a broader range of ideas that ultimately
challenge even those outside the particular enclaves.'94 Another
reason might be that the marginal effects of an increased number
of copyrighted works may be opposite from the gross effects. Just as
the likelihood that we are better off with existing copyright than
with no copyright does not mean that a shrinking of copyright scope
is necessarily bad; so too might a small increase in the number of
works decrease group polarization. It seems unlikely that the
number of media sources would decline sufficiently that the public
would not continue to have a choice among liberal and conservative
outlets. Perhaps marginal books therefore will be those that tend to
take a middle position, because the first books may tend to be more
extremist.
The democratic effects, like the economic ones, are likely to be
small. As Mark Nadel has pointed out, citizens will continue to
receive various forms of "unfiltered" commentary regardless of
whether they receive customized copyrighted content.195 Technologi-
cal and sociological changes affecting group polarization will
probably swamp any effects from copyright law. Similarly, voter
ignorance may be a substantial problem for democracy, but
193. See ROBERT HucKFELDr & JOHN SPRAGUE, CITIZENS, PoLITIcs, AND SOCIAL
COMMUNICATION: INFORMATION AND INFLUENCE IN AN ELECTION CAMPAIGN 105-07 (1995).
194. SUNSTEIN, supra note 188, at 75-79.
195. See Mark S. Nadel, Customized News Services and Extremist Enclaves in
Republic.com, 54 STAN. L. REV. 831, 867-74 (2002) (reviewing SUNsTEIN, supra note 188).
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education is far more likely than copyright to give any hope of a
solution." There are, after all, plenty of existing works-from
sophisticated textbooks on economics to far simpler descriptions of
how government works-that would alleviate ignorance if only
people would read them.'97 That the effects are uncertain and small,
of course, does not make the issue irrelevant. The economic
ramifications of changes in copyright law are perhaps almost as
difficult to anticipate as the political ones, and whether marginal
changes in copyright law occur will not have drastic economic
ramifications either. Moreover, if Jed Rubenfeld is right that the
First Amendment should be read as providing a right to imagine
that trumps any economic considerations of copyright, 98 then no
balancing between economic and constitutional considerations is
even appropriate. In the end, perhaps the most that can be said is
that democratic theory is not so clear that we should cease paying
attention to economics. This Article seeks to clarify the economics,
and democratic theory offers no reason to think an economic point
about product differentiation is more dangerous than any other
economic consideration.
III. APPLICATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
A. Applications
1. Peer-to-Peer Technology
Perhaps the most divisive issue in modern copyright law is the
treatment of peer-to-peer technologies that allow computer users to
share music and video files with other users across the Internet.
The music industry has won some legal battles to shut down peer-
to-peer services,' 99 although it has suffered at least one notable
196. See generally MICHAEL X DELLI-CARPINI & Scorr KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW
ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS (1997) (assessing the problem of voter ignorance); Ilya
Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective on the
Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory 4-5 (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) (noting that voter ignorance has persisted despite improvements in education).
197. One sign that the number of works may be of little importance relative to how those
works are disseminated is that television networks' decisions about which stories to report
have significant effects on viewers' conceptions of what the important issues are. See Shanto
Iyengar et al., Experimental Demonstrations of the Not-So-Minimal" Consequences of
Television News Programs, 76 AM. POL. SC. REv. 848, 848-49 (1982).
198. Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 40 (arguing that imagination should be protected even if
the right causes harm).
199. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002); A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
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setback.2 "° Whatever the courts decide, technological2 °' and legisla-
tive20 2 fights are inevitable. My interest here, however, is not to
conduct a doctrinal analysis, to predict the future of copyright law,
or even to produce a confident normative conclusion about peer-to-
peer technology. Rather, I mean to show how an understanding of
the economics of product differentiation and of demand diversion
can help clarify the existing debates and more clearly reveal what
is at stake.
The content producers' positions on peer-to-peer technology are
as straightforward as they are predictable. Peer-to-peer technology,
when used to distribute copyrighted works without payment to
content producers, facilitates stealing." This is primarily a moral
claim, but content producers back it up with an economic one, that
peer-to-peer technology threatens the profits of record companies. °"
The end result of this theory is that record companies will support
fewer artists, who in turn will create less new music,2 °" reducing
welfare both for consumers who illegally copied and for those who
could not or chose not to do so.' This argument represents a
200. Recording Indus. Ass'n v. Verizon Internet Serv., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
201. An emerging technological development is the creation of file-sharing networks that
purport to make it impossible to trace the identities of file sharers. See, e.g., The Free
Network Project (providing a network that "is entirely decentralized and publishers and
consumers of information are anonymous"), available at http'/lfreenet.sourceforge.nett (last
visited May 22,2004). These networks, which randomly distribute files across large numbers
of computers, have been slow and cumbersome in the past, but new technological
developments may change that. See Will Knight, Interest in Anonymous File-Trading Grows,
NEW SCIENTIST, July 16, 2003, at http'J/www.newscientist.comnnews/news.jsp?id=
ns99993950. Some have claimed, however, that true anonymity is impossible, given the need
to complete sharing transactions. See, e.g., Dawn C. Chmielewski, File Swappers Move
Quickly to Cloak Users' Net Identities, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRiB., July 21, 2003, available at
2003 WL 6597632 ("Technologists working for the entertainment industry say these services
are offering users a false sense of security. They say there's no way to remain anonymous
when exchanging data-otherwise, like a letter without a postal address, the digital package
would never arrive.").
202. A current controversy is over proposals to punish file sharers criminally. See, e.g.,
Author, Consumer, and Computer Owner Protection and Security Act, H.R. 2752, 108th Cong.(2003) (proposing that criminal copyright penalties extend to file sharing).
203. The American public is roughly evenly divided in opinion about whether file sharing
is stealing and should be illegal. See Roper Ctr. for Public Opinion Research, PSRA
Int'l/Newsweek Poll # 2003-NW13: Music Sharing, Sept. 11-12, 2003, at 7 (reporting the
results of a 2000 survey indicating that 48% of Americans thought that file sharing was like
stealing and should be illegal, while 48% thought that music was public property and that file
sharing should not be illegal), available at ftp:Jroperenter.uconn.edu/UnitedStates
%5CPSRA/USPSRA2003-NW13/version2I uspsra2003-nw13.pdf, and at WL POLL Database
USPSRNEW.091303 R18.
204. See supra note 6.
205. For the Recording Industry Association of America's position on music piracy, see
Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Anti-Piracy, at http'J/www.riaa.com/issues/piracy/ default.asp
(last visited July 23, 2003), which analogizes file sharing to piracy of the more ancient kind.
206. Cf Tim Wu, When Code Isn't Law, 89 VA. L. REv. 679, 683-84 (2003) ("The mass of
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paradigmatic emphasis of the incentives part of the incentives-
access paradigm. Without strong copyright protection, perhaps
including even bans on technologies with at least some non-
infringing uses,2 °7 there will be inadequate incentives to create new
works.
Some advocates of peer-to-peer technology have responded by
focusing on the other part of the incentives-access trade-off,
emphasizing that peer-to-peer technology increases access to
copyrighted works.2" Others, however, have questioned the claim
that peer-to-peer technology will have any adverse effect on
incentives. Raymond Ku, for example, argues that Napster and
other peer-to-peer programs are effecting a "creative destruction" of
copyright by eliminating the need for middlemen record
companies.2" Ku emphasizes that "the vast majority of musical
artists do not earn any income in the form of royalties from the sale
of music,"210 and indeed many end up "in debt to the recording
industry for the costs of manufacturing, marketing, and distributing
their music."21' Less than one percent of audio releases generated
sales of a million or more, the level that Ku identifies as being
necessary for an artist to begin receiving royalties.212 The principal
source of revenue for most artists is live performances, though
artists may earn revenue from derivative works as well, such as
concert T-shirts.213 Mark Nadel goes even farther than Ku, arguing
that record companies' revenues are generally used for marketing,
a form of rent seeking that crowds out borderline creation.214 The
result is that copyright law's exclusive reproduction right may have
a net negative effect on the production of copyrighted works.21
regular users pay for the works, thereby maintaining incentives for artists to create them,
while the P2P sub-group defects en masse, occupying the game-theorist's version of utopia.").
207. See generally Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984)
(finding that Sony was not liable for copyright infringement by users of its Betamax product,
in part because that product had "substantial noninfringing uses").
208. For a thoughtful argument along these lines, see Niels Schaumann, Copyright
Infringement and Peer-to-Peer Technology, 28 WM. MrrcHEnL L. REV. 1001, 1045-46 (2002),
which suggests a reinvigoration of Sony to preserve the benefits to the public of file sharing.
209. Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New
Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 263, 269 (2002).
210. Id. at 306-07.
211. Id. at 307.
212. Id. at 307-08.
213. Id. at 309.
214. Mark S. Nadel, Questioning the Economic Justification for Copyright (2003)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http'J/papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=322120.
215. Id. (manuscript at 32-34).
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These predictions that peer-to-peer technology would have no
effect or even increase the production of music may well be faulty.
That most artists earn no money directly from recordings does not
mean that they are indifferent to the potential for such profits.
Musicians may well be motivated by the slim chance that their
recordings will reach the top of the charts, or at least that initial
recordings will provide them publicity that subsequently will allow
them to achieve massive sales with subsequent products. Just
because the music industry has characteristics of a winner-take-all
market does not mean that artists would continue to enter these
markets if the prizes were taken away altogether.21 Although many
artists may receive marketing services in lieu of cash compensation,
this remains a form of compensation, albeit a form that is reinvested
in the market. Even if record companies ceased to exist, artists
presumably would market their products in some fashion, though
perhaps somewhat less than they do today. Though live perfor-
mances probably serve as sufficient compensation for many artists,
some might spend their time in other ways if there was no possibil-
ity of generating wealth from a popular compact disc.
Legalization of digital file sharing thus likely would have a
negative effect on the amount of new music produced, though
perhaps only a modest one. This idea returns us to the familiar
imponderable of the incentives-access trade-off. Product differentia-
tion theory alone cannot resolve this trade-off, but it can provide
some useful clarification. The most obvious implication is that if
there is a slight reduction in the rate at which new works are
produced, consumer welfare will fall by considerably less than this
percentage decrease. The artists most likely to drop out of the music
business will on average be the ones least likely to succeed and thus
most likely to provide the smallest increment to consumer welfare.
Because the marginal works ex ante are not necessarily the
marginal works ex post, some works that would have been success-
ful will never be produced, but the music foregone will, on average,
be less appealing to consumers than the music that remains.
Moreover, consumers will substitute other musical works for the
ones that are no longer produced, in part by listening to familiar
songs more often, and in part by listening to what would otherwise
have been unfamiliar ones. Product differentiation theory shows
that if peer-to-peer technology imposes social welfare losses because
of reduced production incentives, these losses are likely to be
216. Commentators on winner-take-all markets have indeed argued that too many people
will compete for the prizes. See supra Part II.A.l.b.
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smaller than would appear in the absence of product differentiation
theory.
This Article's analysis suggests that peer-to-peer technology
would have little effect on incentives, but that is only one half of the
equation. Peer-to-peer technology certainly increases access to
copyrighted works, but product differentiation theory suggests two
caveats. First, just as the absence of one copyrighted work in the
market may lead a consumer to substitute some other copyrighted
work, so too may the absence of one copyrighted work in an
individual consumer's music collection lead the consumer to
substitute some other work in the collection. Just as doubling the
size of a market for copyrighted works does not double consumer
welfare, doubling the size of an individual user's music collection
does not double that user's utility. The same logic that leads product
differentiation theory to discount the significance of incentives thus
must result in some discounting in the significance of access. This
adjustment, however, is likely to be relatively modest, because peer-
to-peer technology can result in dramatic increases in access.
Although doubling a music collection may have only slightly
beneficial welfare effects, a consumer who downloads thousands of
songs but otherwise would have been able to purchase only a few
compact discs may have dramatically increased welfare.
Second, the focus of product differentiation theory on the fixed
costs associated with producing works clarifies that marginal cost
is not the only criterion relevant to a welfare analysis. Peer-to-peer
technology requires considerable fixed costs, particularly the
increased investment in computers and telecommunications
infrastructure used to share files. Many file sharers would use
computers and high-speed Internet connections even if file sharing
were impossible; that is at least true of many college students, who
participate more than most in file sharing."7 Presumably, however,
many people invest more in technology than they otherwise would
in the absence of file sharing technology,21s and the aggregate
effect of such investment counts as a social cost. This cost, plus the
independent time and money marginal costs associated with
217. The music industry has targeted colleges in its enforcement efforts. See, e.g., Mike
Snider, Lawmakers Say Colleges Failing to Curb Illegal File-Sharing, USA TODAY, Feb. 27,
2003, at D4 (noting that RIAA has sent notice to 2,500 colleges about specific illegal file-
sharers).
218. CD burners are now standard equipment on most desktop computers. See Kevin Hunt,
Record Industry Opens Attack on Consumer Rights, HARTFORD COtRANT, May 23, 2002, at 21.
Although these have substantial noninfringing uses, see id. (noting the use of CD burners to
back up data), computer manufacturers might well not include CD burners if it were not
possible to engage in file sharing. The resulting increased cost of computers is a fixed cost
borne both by file sharers and by others.
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downloading individual works and spoof files, 9 must be lower than
the benefits in terms of increased access that file sharers receive.
When added to whatever reduction in consumer welfare is associ-
ated with the resulting reduction in the number of new works,
however, these costs in theory might be greater than the benefits.
The theory of product differentiation helps clarify the costs and
benefits of peer-to-peer technology, and the net effect is theoretically
indeterminate. The theory nonetheless seems at least to provide
some ammunition to support the legalization of sharing of digital
works. The fundamental choice is whether it is worth having
somewhat fewer new works and much greater access to existing
works, and the theory of product differentiation especially casts
doubt on the significance of the former. This conclusion, however,
seems weaker for other media contexts, such as motion pictures.
Movies cost far more to make than individual musical compositions,
and in the long run, legalization of file sharing could have drastic
effects on theater revenues.' ° Movie theaters offer larger screens
than even the most technologically advanced living rooms, and some
movies earn considerable merchandising revenue, but these
advantages might not be sufficient to support more than a fraction
of the number of movies currently being produced.22' Regardless of
the correctness of this analysis, it reveals that a welfare analysis of
peer-to-peer technology is sensitive to the relevant facts about the
particular market.
219. Spoof files are files placed by content producers and companies that they have hired,
such as Overpeer, Inc., that purport to be actual copyrighted works but in fact are not. See,
e.g., Benny Evangelista, Firm Sleuths Out Illegal File Sharers, S.F. CHRON., July 21, 2003,
at El.
220. The movie industry recently began an advertising campaign seeking to discourage file
sharing by highlighting craftspeople whose livelihoods would be adversely affected. See
Associated Press, Don't Pirate Movies ... Please! (July 22, 2003), available at http'JAvww.
cbsnews.com/stories/2003/07/22/entertainment/main564436.shtml (last visited May 22, 2004).
It should not be surprising that the movie industry rather than the music industry has taken
this approach. Consumers may have little sympathy for the most successful musical
performers and may be skeptical that file sharing harms the relatively unsuccessful ones.
Moreover, the most obvious supporting personnel for such a campaign in the music contexts
work on live performances, and their jobs are therefore less susceptible to file sharing.
221. That product differentiation theory provides tentative support for legalizing some
forms of file sharing, however, does not by itself suggest that existing file sharing is welfare-
increasing. One problem with illegal file sharing is that such mass illegality breeds disrespect
for the law. Cf JANICE NADLER, FLOUTING THE LAW: DOES PERCEIVED INJUSTICE PROVOKE
GENERAL NON-COMPLIANCE? 4 (Northwestern Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 02-9, Apr. 1,
2002) (providing experimental evidence for the proposition that observation of individuals
violating the law makes others more likely to act similarly), available at http'J/papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=353745. Moreover, there are troublesome distributive
consequences to illegal file sharing. Those who violate the law have increased access to
copyrighted works, both in terms of reduced availability of works and possibly in terms of
greater prices.
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2. The Copyright Term
Product differentiation theory can also inform the debate on the
copyright term, though once again the issue is more complicated
than may first appear. The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998,
upheld recently in Eldred v. Ashcroft,222 provides for a term of
seventy years past the death of the author,2" with a similarly long
term in the case of works for hire.22 As economists pointed out, the
term extension for works not yet created will have only a tiny effect
on production incentives, increasing the present value of a new work
by no more than 0.33%.225 The first cut from product differentiation
theory is that this number overstates the value created by the term
extension. Any additional works created as a result will be the
marginal works that are least likely to contribute to consumer
surplus, and there likely will be many ready substitutes for them.
The costs in terms of anticipated reduced access to works years in
the future look even larger than they would appear in the absence
of product differentiation theory.
Product differentiation theory can make this picture more
nuanced. New works are created in part to compete with old works.
Because newer works are more up-to-date than older works, they
provide quality improvements, but much of the revenue associated
with newer works comes at the expense of existing works. The
incentive to create new works thus is in part business stealing.
Some consumers, however, might on occasion prefer an older work
priced at marginal cost to a newer work. With a very long copyright
term, however, works in the public domain will tend to be so old
that they will be unlikely to serve as effective substitutes, and older
works still under copyright will be sold at some level above marginal
cost, if at all. A shorter copyright term would make older works
more effective substitutes for newer works, and it would change the
calculus of producers of new works. Some marginal new works
whose revenues come mostly at the expense of older works might
not be produced. Thus, there exists an additional mechanism by
which a long copyright term may increase the number of new works,
and given the relatively small effect from increase in present value,
this effect might be of considerably greater magnitude.
222. 537 U.S. 186, 194 (2003).
223. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2004).
224. Id. § 302(c) (providing a term of 95 years from date of first publication or 120 years
from creation, whichever is less).
225. Brief of Amici Curiae George A. Akerlof et al. at 6, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186
(2003) (No. 01-618). The 0.33% figure is based on an assumption that works will produce
identical revenues each year.
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Such an increase, however, does not provide a straightforward
endorsement of a long copyright term, nor does it even necessarily
make the incentives-access trade-off closer than would otherwise
appear. After all, the works that will not be produced with a shorter
copyright term will tend to be works whose anticipated profits with
the longer copyright term stem more from demand diversion than
from market expansion. The long copyright term may in fact tend to
induce production of the very works that are least likely to contrib-
ute to social welfare. Even if this effect could be quantified, it does
not exhaust the implications of the long copyright term. I have
focused so far on the exclusive right to reproduce copyrighted
works,226 but an additional important right is the right to prepare
derivative works.22v In a separate paper, I argue that rent dissipa-
tion concerns, which are related to the product differentiation theory
addressed here, may help justify a long copyright term, because
derivative works will tend to be the most rent dissipating.2" For
present purposes it will suffice to say that although product
differentiation theory clarifies the economics of copyright, it may
invite more lines of inquiry than it resolves.
B. Implications
1. Copyright and Distributive Justice
The concern for access manifested in the standard approach to
copyright law's incentives-access trade-off does not distinguish
among consumers of copyrighted works. Although copyright law
may provide greater or less access to copyrighted works, the
consumers who will receive such access are never differentiated.
Copyright scholars have made no attempts to link copyright policy
to broader issues of distributive justice.2" In this Article, I have
already explored distributional issues, by considering issues of
distribution between consumers and producers and by recognizing
that copyrighted works may have attributes of positional goods and
that demand diversion may explain the winner-take-all nature of
226. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2000).
227. Id. § 106(2).
228. See MICHAEL ABRAMOWICZ, CoPYRIGHT REDUNDANCY (2003) (George Mason Law &
Econ. Research PaperNo. 03-03),availableathttp//papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract
_ id=374580.
229. But cf Shubha Ghosh, The Merits of Ownership; or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying
and Love Intellectual Property, 15 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 453,495 (2002) (book review) (referring
in passing to the connection between copyright law and distributive justice).
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copyright markets.23 ° These considerations strengthened the
argument that marginal copyrighted works make only relatively
small contributions to consumer welfare. They do not, however,
directly address the connection between copyright policy and the
distribution of society's wealth to the rich and poor.
The lack of attention among copyright scholars to distributive
justice is surprising given the attention that the issue receives in
patent law."' This disparity is largely a result of the market for
pharmaceutical products, where the availability of intellectual
property is an issue of life and death, not merely of dollars and
cents.23 2 The economics of copyright, however, are similar to the
economics of patent. What makes issues concerning patents for
prescription drugs so salient is not just that drugs can improve
health, an observation that can cut either toward emphasizing
incentives or toward emphasizing access; rather, what drives
criticisms of the existing regime is that many patients cannot afford
pharmaceuticals that have already been developed and could be
produced at low marginal cost.233 Though the stakes are entertain-
ment and information rather than health, much the same dynamic
exists in the copyright context. Low-income individuals surely
purchase some copyrighted works and enjoy free copyrighted works
such as television programs, just as relatively poor people can afford
relatively inexpensive drugs. Income, however, limits access to
copyrighted works and results in low-income individuals not
purchasing copyrighted works that they may value at more than
marginal cost.
By refining the incentives-access paradigm, the product differen-
tiation literature clarifies that the costs of self-conscious regulatory
efforts to increase access to copyrighted works in low-income
communities might be far less than the benefits. Copyright owners
have some incentive to market to poor communities and to price
discriminate in favor of the poor,23' but they will of course ordinarily
230. See supra Part II.A.l.b.
231. For a useful discussion of patent law and distributive justice, see Abraham Bell &
Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L. REv. 1, 68 (2002).
232. See generally Arti K Rai, The Information Revolution Reaches Pharmaceuticals:
Balancing Innovation Incentives, Cost, and Access in the Post-Genomics Era, 2001 U. ILL. L.
REV. 173 (2001) (providing a careful analysis of distributive issues involved in the
pharmaceutical context).
233. For an article emphasizing that drugs to treat AIDS exist but are too expensive for
many people in the developing world, see Tina Rosenberg, Look at Brazil, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
28, 2001, § 6 (Magazine), at 26.
234. See generally Meurer, supra note 12, at 91-92 (noting that price discrimination may,
but need not always, favor relatively low income buyers).
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do so only to the extent that it is profitable . 235 Lowering price for the
relatively poor too much may hurt copyright owners, both because
of the danger of arbitrage and because poor individuals who would
have purchased the relevant product in any event will no longer
have to pay as much for it. The privately optimal level of discounts
for the relatively poor might not be the socially optimal level. If
copyright owners were required to grant discounts for the poor that
were greater than whatever price discrimination they ordinarily
would engage in, then there would be a negative effect on incentives
to produce new works, but probably only a small effect given the
relatively low purchasing power of the poor, and a positive effect on
access. The rich-poor axis is a dimension on which conscious
attempts by the designers of copyright law to increase access to
copyrighted works would likely have only small costs.
Admittedly, it is difficult in most copyright contexts to determine
just how copyright law could operationalize preferences for the poor.
Perhaps fair use doctrine could take it into account, although this
would make an already jumbled area of the law even less
coherent.2 36 Regulation of broadcasters and telecommunications
companies, however, might provide one means of increasing access.
For example, suppose that the government required cable television
companies in a large competitive market to offer service at cost in
poor neighborhoods. This would surely reduce profits-some poor
people, after all, would be willing to pay for cable service-and
reduce entry as well. If different cable companies are differentiated
products, the decreased diversity of offerings would drive up prices
for other consumers, and some would drop out of the market.
Nonetheless, the total number of consumers receiving cable
television service, and perhaps even gross consumer surplus among
all consumers,237 might increase.
235. Some patent owners, particularly owners of patents for pharmaceutical drugs, have
started programs that may well lose money in an effort to ensure poor people access to the
drugs. See, e.g., Merri Rosenberg, Free Medications for Uninsured Elderly, N.Y. TIMES, June
29, 2003, § 14WC, at 3 (describing one such program). Public relations is a better explanation
for such attempts than benevolence.
236. Preferences for the poor, however, would fit into the dominant academic theory of fair
use, which suggests that fair use is appropriate in conditions of market failure. See, e.g.,
Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the
Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600 (1982). The costs of contracting
and of verifying income may prevent copyright owners from giving price breaks to low income
consumers, and these contracting costs are a type of market failure that commentators on fair
use have considered. See id. at 1628-30.
237. The caveat is that wealthier consumers are likely to have higher gross consumer
surpluses. A strict wealth maximization approach would thus have to count cable service for
the wealthy as more important than cable service for the poor. Cf David Copp, The Theory
and Rationale of Cost-BenefitAnalysis, 23 THEoRY& DECISIONS 65,74-77 (1987) (arguing that
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Creation of such a regulatory regime would require the institution
of a complex regulatory framework,28 but the case for a universal
service mandate in some ways seems stronger for cable companies
than for telephone companies, to which universal service mandates
currently apply.239 An alternative approach could achieve a similar
result through copyright law itself. For example, a provision might
allow infringement by cable operators in relatively poor neighbor-
hoods. With such a provision, individuals in qualifying neighbor-
hoods would only have to pay for the cost of the wires and the
service, not for the cost of the underlying copyrighted works. This
approach might even have the beneficial effect of making low-
income areas relatively more attractive places to live, slightly
reducing concentrated poverty.2" Both of these approaches may well
seem radical and politically infeasible, but this may be in part
because copyright law is generally not seen as a vehicle for achiev-
ing distributive justice. This Article's analysis suggests that it is in
some ways a particularly strong vehicle, because there is only a
minimal social cost, in terms of reduced works produced, to free
provision of copyrighted works to the poor.
Distributive justice is relevant to other copyright issues as well.
A recent body of literature has developed concerning a possible
resolution of the file-sharing controversy, under which the govern-
ment would legalize file sharing and then compensate the owners of
copyrighted works based on the number of times their works have
been downloaded.241 A problem with such a regime is that only those
cost-benefit analysis unfairly favors the wealthy). Allowance of wealth distribution as a
relevant variable, however, might lead to the opposite conclusion.
238. The regulatory task would not be altogether unfamiliar, however, as much of the
apparatus of natural monopoly regulation could be adopted. See generally KENNETH E. TRAIN,
OPTIMAL REGULATION: THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY (1991) (providing an
overview of the economics of natural monopoly regulation).
239. See generally William P. Cassidy, Jr., Comment, Universal Service in a Competitive
Telecommunications Environment: The Current State of Universal Service in the European
Union and United States, 25 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 107 (1999) (providing a comparative
overview of universal service requirements). Telephone service, of course, may be more of a
necessity than cable service. In the cable context, however, much of the cost of a universal
service mandate ultimately will be reflected in a reduction in the number of copyrighted
works, while universal service guarantees in other contexts simply shift costs from some
consumers to others.
240. That would accentuate an already existing trend. See, e.g., PAUL A. JARGOWSKY,
STUNNING PROGRESS, HIDDEN PROBLEMS: THE DRAMATIC DECLINE OF CONCENTRATED POVERTY
IN THE 1990S (Brookings Inst., Living Cities Census Series, May 2003), at http'//www.
brookings.edu/es/urban/publicationsargowskypoverty.pdf (last visited May 22, 2004).
241. William W. Fisher, An Alternative Compensation System, in PROMISES TO KEEP:
TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT (forthcoming 2004), available at
httpJ/cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/PTKChapter6.pdf (last visited May 22, 2004); Neil
Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File
Sharing, 17 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 1, 4 (2003).
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who can afford the relevant equipment would benefit. If it is feasible
to create a reward system to compensate copyright owners for lost
profits from file sharing,242 then it presumably also would be feasible
to have a reward system compensate copyright owners for lost
profits from other forms of copying. There may well be administra-
tive challenges in creating reward systems,2" but one beneficial
aspect of conventional reward system proposals is that they allow
everyone access to the relevant intellectual property. A reward
system that allowed benefits only to those able to invest in technol-
ogy would have all of the limitations of a typical reward system, but
also negative distributional effects. This Article's analysis suggests
that any additional social loss from a broader reward system than
one devoted to file sharing might be less than ordinarily would
appear, even though copyright owners could not receive rewards
equal to what they would have been able to obtain ordinarily.
2. Copyright Across Time
Justin Hughes and Joseph Liu recently offered independent
suggestions that fair use doctrine should take into account the
amount of time before the end of the copyright term on the infringed
work.2" Hughes argued that as the economic justifications for fair
use become stronger, the later in the copyright term an infringe-
ment occurs.2" In contrast, Liu emphasized that the incentives
justification for copyright protection becomes weaker later in the
copyright term.2" These analyses are startling because we are not
accustomed to the notion that the intellectual property calculus
changes over time, but they are consistent with the underlying
justifications for copyright protection. Yet, if the case for allowing
fair use may change over time with respect to a particular copy-
righted work, might not the case for copyright protection as a whole
change over time as well? This Article's analysis suggests that the
answer may be yes. The more copyrighted works that exist, the
more substitutes there are for any particular work, and the greater
the emphasis that access should receive in the incentives-access
242. For my views on whether it would be feasible, see Michael Abramowicz, Copyrighted
Works as Public Goods (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
243. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115 (2003)
(discussing problems of existing proposals for reward systems, which focus on patent but also
consider copyright in a few instances).
244. Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775 (2003); Liu, supra note
1.
245. Hughes, supra note 244, at 778-84.
246. Liu, supra note 1, at 433 ("[Tlhe value of the additional incentive to the author
decreases the further out we go on the copyright term.").
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trade-off. Because the number of copyrighted works, and indeed the
rate at which copyrighted works are produced, is growing over
time,247 this argument suggests that copyright generally should
become less strict over time.
There are at least two caveats to this conclusion. First, the world
is becoming more complicated and specialized over time, so a
greater number of works may not mean that there are more
relevant substitutes for any particular work. That copyright
provides incentives to fill new needs is indeed one of its virtues, but
increasing complexity seems unlikely to explain all of the growth in
availability of copyrighted works. Some of the increase in the
number of copyrighted works is likely attributable simply to the
increased size of the population. With an increased population
should come some increase in the number of works, but there is no
theoretical reason that society should enjoy the benefits of greater
demand and supply of copyrighted works almost entirely on the
incentives side of the incentives-access trade-off. In a world with a
copyright regime that allowed greater access over time, we might
enjoy both increased production of works over time and increased
access to the works that are produced.
Second, copying technology has improved over time and is likely
to continue to improve as computer technology becomes ever
more commonplace in portable devices. A natural technological
tendency will undermine copyright over time, and the increased
expansiveness of copyright doctrine, especially with respect to
technology-specific legislation like the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act,24 may serve as a counterweight. This Article's analysis
suggests that perhaps this counterweight may not be as necessary
as we might otherwise believe. If increased copying merely slows
the acceleration of production of copyrighted works, the access
benefits may well be worthwhile. Of course, copying could become
so pervasive that the number of new copyrighted works might
actually decrease, making the case for an expanded copyright
stronger. The product differentiation perspective, however, at least
points to the economically relevant aspect of the incentives portion
of the incentives-access trade-off, which is the number of works
produced, not simply the profits of the producers.
247. See supra note 26.
248. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2863 (1998), (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-
1205 (2000)).
10920041
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
CONCLUSION
This Article has challenged the standard law-and-economics
account of copyright by relaxing the assumption that copyrighted
works are produced in perfectly competitive markets. Copyrighted
works are better understood as differentiated products, and this
understanding highlights the fact that many copyrighted works are
similar to other copyrighted works, and that part of the incentive
for the production of a new work is that some consumers will
purchase the new work instead of another work. In theory, such
demand diversion may lead to overentry in markets for copyrighted
works, but the phenomenon of demand diversion emphasizes that
marginal copyrighted works are, on average, likely to produce less
social value than inframarginal works. Changes in copyright policy
or technological developments that would reduce the number of
copyrighted works will thus reduce consumer welfare only by a
smaller amount, and this loss may be worth bearing if these
changes or developments increase consumers' access to copyrighted
works. Product differentiation theory demands greater attention to
the access part of copyright's incentives-access trade-off than would
appear appropriate in the absence of this theory.
Any conclusions about specific aspects of copyright law must be
tentative, relying on theoretical rather than empirical consider-
ations. The tension between production of new works and dissemi-
nation of existing ones is already quite complex, and the consider-
ation of demand diversion and rent dissipation adds another
wrinkle. The recent empirical turn of industrial organization
scholarship249 and development of both data sources.. and tools
make the prospect of careful welfare analysis a plausible one.
Industrial organization scholars have already analyzed entry into
the markets for yellow pages directories25' and radio broadcasting. 2
249. This turn has been called the "new empirical industrial organization." E.g., www.aw-
bc.com/info/waldman-jensen/book.html (advertising a new edition of an industrial
organization textbook by emphasizing its treatment of the "new empirical industrial
organization").
250. One new source that will be useful if made available to scholars is Nielsen's Bookscan
data tracking retail sales of over 140,000 titles. See httpA/www.booktrack.co.uk (discussing
the data source).
251. See MARC RYSMAN, COMPETITION BETWEEN NETWORKS: A STUDY OF THE MARKET FOR
YELLOW PAGES (Boston Univ. Indus. Studies Project working Paper No. 104, Feb. 12, 2002),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=300450. Yellow pages
markets involve complexities that do not always exist in markets for other copyrighted goods,
particularly the existence of advertising and the resulting existence of network externalities.
252. See Steven T. Berry & Joel Waldfogel, Free Entry and Social Inefficiency in Radio
Broadcasting, 30 RAND J. ECON. 397 (1999). Berry and Waldfogel find a large business-
stealing effect but note that the overentry from the producers' perspective might be optimal
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We should not have too much confidence that an answer will come
shortly, let alone that the state of the art will soon develop to the
point where economists could offer useful testimony in individual
copyright cases. A recent cutting edge industrial organization article
with a similar ambition analyzed the social welfare effects of the
introduction of the minivan,2 and the diversity of copyrighted
works is likely to make the analogous project considerably more
challenging.2 4 Perhaps this Article's safest claim is that the most
significant future research on copyright will come not from legal
scholars borrowing broad generalizations of economic theory, but
from economists seeking to combine more nuanced theory with ever
more sophisticated econometric tools. The literature on product
differentiation provides a framework for this more refined analysis
of copyright policy.
if consumers' valuations of listening to radio are sufficiently high.
253. See AMIL PETRIN, QUANTIPMG THE BENEFrrs OF NEW PRODUCTS: THE CASE OF THE
MINIVAN (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8227, Apr. 2001), at
http'J/papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstractid=266197.
254. One challenge is that a welfare analysis requires data on revenue and costs. See Berry
& Waldfogel, supra note 252, at 398 ("To calculate the optimal number of firms in an industry,
one needs information on revenues and costs. In particular, one needs to know how revenue
per firm changes with entry."). An additional challenge is that many attributes of consumer
products are unobservable or at least not easily coded, and it is thus difficult to determine the
extent to which products are substitutes for one another. See, e.g., Daniel A. Ackerberg &
Marc Rysman, Unobserved Product Differentiation in Discrete Choice Models: Estimating
Price Elasticities and Welfare Effects (Feb. 4, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) (considering some of the econometric difficulties associated with unobserved product
differentiation and biases that can result in attempts at estimation). A recent econometric
technique that seeks to avoid this problem is to calculate the covariance of utility for different
products across consumers. See, e.g., Ronald L. Goettler & Ron Shachar, Spatial Competition
in the Network Television Industry, 32 RAND J. ECON. 624 (2001) (using this technique in
assessing competition by television networks for viewers). A similar technique is likely to be
helpful in analyzing markets for books, but the large number of books relative to the number
of television shows on networks at any given time may make the project far more challenging.
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APPENDIX
This Appendix reports the results of a simulation study of entry
into markets for copyrighted works.255 The simulation is designed to
reveal how the values of different parameters, reflecting both the
economics of the particular market and the possibility of copying,
affect the degree of overentry or underentry into the market, as well
as total social welfare.
The following is a step-by-step description of the algorithm for the
simulation. Italics are used to indicate parameters that were varied
to determine the effect on the outcome.
Step 1: Consumer entry. A group of numconsumers representa-
tive consumers is placed in a dim-dimensional address space. Each
representative consumer represents 10,000 actual consumers, so a
purchase by a representative consumer counts 10,000 times in the
calculations of producer and consumer surplus that will be reported
below. A random number generator is used to assign a variety of
characteristics to each representative consumer, as follows:
Location. Each representative consumer is assigned to a
random location in the address space. Each dimension in the
address space is bounded by 0 and 10. The random number
generator produces a uniform distribution among those values,
and the selection of each dimension is independent. For example,
if dim = 2, then a representative consumer is as likely to be
positioned at (1.10, 1.10) as at (9.90, 5.60) or (1.34, 8.56).
Gross consumer surplus. Each representative consumer is
randomly assigned a gross consumer surplus from a uniform
distribution between minsurplus and maxsurplus. A represen-
tative consumer's gross consumer surplus is the maximum
amount that the representative consumer will pay for a work,
counting both dollar costs and transport costs.
Transport cost. Each representative consumer is randomly
assigned a transport cost from a uniform distribution between
mintransport and maxtransport. The transport cost reflects
how costly in dollars it is to a consumer to purchase a work
located in product space at a point some distance from the
consumer's current location. For example, if a representative
consumer's gross consumer surplus is 10.0, and the representa-
tive consumer's transport cost is 2.0, then the consumer will be
willing to spend up to 4.0 to purchase a work located at a
255. The complete C++ source code for the simulation, as well as the full output from
execution of the simulation, is available from the author.
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distance of 3.0 from the consumer, assuming there is no better
deal elsewhere.
Ability to copy. Each representative consumer is randomly
determined to be capable of copying works or incapable of doing
so. The probability that a consumer is assigned to the group that
is capable of copying works is percent can-copy.
Quality concern. Each representative consumer who is
assigned to the group that is capable of copying works is
randomly assigned a "quality concern" from a uniform distribu-
tion between 0 and maxqualityconcern. This parameter
interacts with a separate parameter, quality-degrade, which is
selected for the entire simulation.
These parameters operate to affect how much gross consumer
surplus a representative consumer obtains from a copy of the work.
Gross consumer surplus is multiplied by (1 - quality concern * (1 -
quality-degrade)). For example, suppose a representative con-
sumer's gross consumer surplus is 10.0. If this representative
consumer's quality concern is 1.0 and quality-degrade is 0.8, then
the gross surplus that a consumer would obtain from the copy is
only 8.0. If the representative consumer's quality concern were 0.5,
keeping all other parameters the same, then the gross surplus that
a consumer would obtain from the copy is 9.0. The higher
quality-degrade, the greater the reduction a copy produces in gross
consumer surplus for consumers in general, and the higher quality
concern, the greater the reduction in gross consumer surplus for a
particular consumer.
Step 2: Producer entry. A producer enters. The producer's work
is placed at a random point in address space, using the same
algorithm used to place the representative consumers. To enter, the
producer pays fixedcost.
Step 3: Producer price optimization. After entry, the producer
sets an initial price by anticipating the choices of the representative
consumers. The producers have full information about the represen-
tative consumers and about other producers' locations and prices.
(Therefore, the producers perfectly anticipate the consumer
purchases in Step 5, below.) No producer will ever set a price lower
than marginal-cost, which will be charged to the producer for each
purchase. In setting a price, the producers consider how many
consumers will decide to purchase from the producer at each
possible price. For simplicity, however, each producer assumes that
the other producers will not change their prices. That is, no
producer considers whether a change in its own price might lead one
of its rivals to change its prices in turn.
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Step 4: Repeated producer entry. Steps 2 and 3 are repeated
four times, so that producers enter in groups of five before the
consumers make their purchasing decisions.
Step 5: Tentative consumer purchases. Each representative
consumer decides whether to make a purchase, a copy, or neither.
To do this, the representative consumer first calculates the net
surplus that it would obtain from purchasing from each producer.
The net surplus is equal to gross consumer surplus - distance *
transport cost - price. If the representative consumer is one who is
randomly assigned to the group that can copy, then the representa-
tive consumer also calculates the net surplus that it would obtain
from copying, taking into account the cost-of copying, which reflects
factors such as the time cost of downloading or duplicating copy-
righted works. The net surplus from copying is equal to gross
consumer surplus - distance * transport cost - cost-of copying. If
the net surplus from all possible copying and purchasing is less than
zero, then the consumer will neither purchase nor copy any work
(and thus receives a net consumer surplus of zero). Otherwise, the
consumer maximizes net surplus in determining whether to
purchase or copy and from whom.
Step 6: Reoptimization of producer prices. Based on these
tentative consumer decisions, producers reoptimize their prices, as
in Step 3. Producer decisions may change in part because of the
entry of other producers.
Step 7: Consumer purchases. Consumers make their purchase
decisions, as in Step 5. After these purchase decisions are made, the
simulation calculates total producer and consumer surplus. The
total producer surplus aggregates revenue from all consumers
(10,000 per representative consumers), less fixed and marginal
costs. The total consumer surplus aggregates the net consumer
surplus of all consumers, according to the formulas indicated in Step
5. The simulation also calculates the marginal producer surplus, i.e.,
the producer surplus of the last producer to enter.
Step 8: Repeat. Steps 2 through 7 are repeated, until a total of
150 producers have entered.
Step 9: Iterate. Steps 1 through 8 are repeated, so that the
simulation is run a total of 200 times. The simulation then calcu-
lates the optimal entry and equilibrium entry. The optimal entry is
the number of producers that produce the highest total surplus. The
equilibrium entry is the largest number of producers for which the
marginal producer surplus is greater than zero. Note that because
producers enter five at a time (to conserve computer processing
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power) the equilibrium and optimal levels of entry will be reported
as multiples of five.
Before reporting the results, there are several caveats worth
mentioning. Even if we could ensure that each parameter repre-
sented the appropriate value for a particular market, the simulation
model as a whole contains a number of significant simplifications.
In a real market, variables like gross consumer surplus might not
be distributed uniformly. Fixed and marginal costs might vary from
producer to producer, and higher cost works might tend to be of
higher quality. Instead of purchasing zero or one works, each
consumer in a real market may produce any number of works, and
a simulation taking that into account would need to feature a
variety of parameters, including parameters reflecting the con-
sumer's income, taste for the type of work in general, and taste for
diversity of works. Producer pricing might not be based on complete
information. Producers are likely to consider the price responses of
their rivals to their pricing decisions. Moreover, although this
simulation assumes one work per producer, a more realistic
simulation would recognize that each producer might produce a
number of works, and the relatively small number of producers to
works might dampen price competition. The purpose of this
simulation, however, is not to produce definitive conclusions, but to
provide a richer framework than is possible within the confines of
a particular economic model and to draw tentative conclusions
about the effects of altering different parameters.
The following table reflects a single execution of the simulation
with a baseline set of parameters. These parameters were selected
in part because they seemed both computationally manageable and
at least roughly reasonable for markets for typical copyright goods,
and in part because in this combination, optimal and equilibrium
entry were approximately equal. The purpose of this table is not to
determine whether entry is excessive or inadequate; both results
can be achieved with adjustment of different parameters. Rather, it
is to provide a baseline from which to assess changes in different
parameters. In particular, this baseline will help test the theory
that even if entry is optimal, policy changes may still improve social
welfare. Of course, any conclusions could be different with an
alternative baseline, and with the number of parameters in this
model, it is impossible to test all possibilities. I have, however, not
found the principal conclusions to vary with reasonable changes in
the parameters.
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Table 1: Baseline simulation
The parameter values for this simulation are as follows: numconsumers
= 70, min-surplus = 5, max-surplus = 45, mintransport = 0.5,
maxtransport = 4.5, max.quality-concern = 1.0, fixed-cost = 45000,
marginal_cost = 3.0, cost-of copy = 3.0, quality-degrade = 0.7,
percent-can-copy = 0.4, dim = 4. The columns, from left to right, are as
follows: # indicates the number of producers, PS indicates total producer
surplus per potential consumer, CS indicates total consumer surplus per
potential consumer, TS indicates total surplus per potential consumer, S%
indicates the percentage of potential consumers who make purchases, C%
indicates the percentage of potential consumers who copy, AP indicates the
average price paid by consumers who make purchases, and MPS indicates
the producer surplus of the last producer to enter. All of these numbers are
averages across 150 iterations. In this simulation, optimal entry and
equilibrium entry both turn out to be 35 firms.
5 1 0.568 1 1.01 1 1.58 0.114 0.133 0.0472 9.99
10 0.634 1.54 2.18 0.0745 0.207 0.0509 9.33
15 0.614 1.97 2.58 0.0526 0.263 0.0539 9.10
20 0.498 2.24 2.74 0.0344 0.305 0.0531 8.93
25 0.362 2.47 2.84 0.0165 0.340 0.0501 8.84
30 0.234 2.68 2.92 0.0094 0.371 0.0499 8.87
35 0.0744 2.87 2.94 0.0126 0.399 0.0481 8.86
40 -0.0915 3.00 2.91 -0.00591 0.421 0.0476 8.92
45 -0.252 3.13 2.88 0.00084 0.442 0.0479 9.01
50 -0.463 3.26 2.80 -0.0119 0.463 0.0473 8.97
55 -0.677 3.40 2.72 -0.00959 0.482 0.0469 8.96
60 -0.883 3.51 2.63 -0.0189 0.498 0.0469 9.00
65 -1.11 3.59 2.48 -0.0159 0.512 0.0459 9.01
70 -1.37 3.68 2.31 -0.0141 0.525 0.0451 8.98
75 -1.57 3.76 2.19 -0.0203 0.538 0.0436 9.06
80 -1.81 3.84 2.04 -0.0219 0.550 0.0427 9.09
85 -2.05 3.92 1.88 -0.0151 0.561 0.0414 9.11
90 -2.28 3.99 1.71 -0.027 0.572 0.0404 9.15
95 -2.53 4.05 1.52 -0.022 0.583 0.0396 9.16
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10 -3.03 4.16 1.13 -0.0278 0.604 0.039 9.17
11 -3.28 4.21 0.939 -0.0262 0.612 0.0382 9.22
11 -3.56 4.27 0.717 -0.0357 0.620 0.0371 9.20
12 -3.79 4.33 0.534 -0.0144 0.629 0.0366 9.25
12 -4.04 4.37 0.330 -0.0253 0.638 0.0359 9.28
13 -4.30 4.41 0.113 -0.027 0.645 0.0355 9.30
13 -4.57 4.46 -0.110 -0.0361 0.652 0.0351 9.31
14 -4.85 4.51 -0.342 -0.0404 0.659 0.0347 9.31
14 -5.10 4.56 -0.540 -0.0369 0.667 0.0334 9.34
15 -5.36 4.60 -0.759 -0.0306 0.673 0.0326 9.37
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This simulation reflects the central point of this Article, that the
business stealing phenomenon means that marginal works will be
of less economic importance than inframarginal works. (All
parameter values that I have experimented with produce the same
basic result.) This can be seen by considering changes in the
number of producers on producer surplus, consumer surplus, and
total surplus. As more producers enter the market, consumer
surplus always rises, because consumers always benefit from
increases in the number of works, but each increase is smaller than
the last. As the number of producers rises from 0 to 5 to 10,
consumer surplus increases from 0 to 1.01 to 1.54, but when the
number of producers rises from 30 to 35, consumer surplus rises
from 2.68 to just 2.87. At the same time, however, producer surplus
quickly begins to fall, with a decline from 0.634 to 0.614 as the
number of producers falls from 10 to 15. These numbers reflect the
sum of all producers' surplus, so the benefit of entry to the 11th
through 15th producers are less than the costs of such entry to the
1st through 10th. (Note that both the consumer and producer
surplus numbers are expressed relative to a constant, the total
number of potential consumers in the market, i.e., numconsumers
* 10,000.) The total surplus (sum of producer and consumer surplus)
begins to fall after 35 producers have entered, and the optimal
number of firms is thus 35. The column indicating marginal
producer surplus shows that the equilibrium number of firms is 35
as well.
The remaining columns of Table 1 further illustrate business
stealing. Note that the percentage of consumers who make pur-
chases rises dramatically initially as more producers enter, but then
levels off. With 5 producers, 13.3% of potential consumers make
purchases; with 10, 20.7%. As the number of producers increases
from 30 to 35, the percentage of consumers making purchases rises
from 37.1% to just 39.9%. Interestingly, the percentage of consum-
ers who choose to copy in this model initially rises as the number of
producers increases but then falls. The initial rise reflects that the
cost of copying becomes increasingly worth bearing as consumers
find works that are more precisely what they seek. The subsequent
fall reflects that increased competition makes purchasing more
attractive, and therefore some consumers decide to purchase
instead of copying. The change in price is reflected in the average
price column, which generally falls with increased numbers of
producers, though at times the price rises. Price increases may be
possible because once a producer loses its marginal customers, it
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may raise its price so that it can obtain more revenue from its
inframarginal customers. (Idiosyncratic deviations from trend may
also reflect noise attributable to the random element of the
simulations.) It is striking, however, that the average price charged
to purchasing consumers never changes very much, staying always
between $8.84 and $9.99.
Let us now consider how changing various parameters of the
model affect the results. Consider, for example, Table 2, which
illustrates how changes in the principal parameters defining
representative consumers affect consumers. Each of the parameters
whose value is altered is represented in reverse print, along with
the different values of that variable simulated. All other parameters
besides the single variable tested are set to the same values as in
the baseline simulation in Table 1.2 In the rows beneath the top
row, the consumer surplus, producer surplus, and total surplus
associated with the equilibrium level of entry are reported. Each of
these values is provided for ease of comparability in terms of the
number of potential consumers, which is constant for all parameters
except, of course, for alterations in the numconsumers variable.
Below total surplus is listed the maximum total surplus, i.e., the
total surplus associated with optimal rather than equilibrium entry.
Finally, the last three rows indicate the optimal number of firms,
the number of firms that enter in equilibrium, and the difference
between these two numbers (positive for excess entry or negative for
insufficient entry).
256. In some columns, the parameter is set to the same value as in the baseline simulation.
Nonetheless, because the simulations were generated anew to produce these tables, and thus
the numbers reported here may differ slightly from those in Table 1 as a result of random
factors.
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Table 2: Effect of changes in consumer parameters
This table illustrates the effect of changes in the number of
consumers, the maximum consumer surplus (the higher end of the
consumer surplus range from which any given consumer's surplus
is selected), and the maximum transport costs (the higher end of the
range from which any given consumer's transport cost is selected).
Consumer surplus 1.34 2.00 2.04 2.49 2.75
Producer surplus 0.12 -0.11 0.16 0.06 -0.09
Total surplus 1.46 1.89 2.20 2.55 2.66
Max total surplus 1.48 1.90 2.20 2.55 2.66
Optimal entry 15 15 20 30 40
Equilibrium entry 10 20 20 30 40
Excess entry 5 5 0 0 0
w kI6 N-il ib0lmil i
Consumer surplus 3.18 2.80 3.05 3.37 3.63
Producer surplus -0.30 0.26 0.18 0.03 -0.01
Total surplus 2.88 3.06 3.23 3.40 3.62
Max total surplus 2.96 3.07 3.24 3.43 3.65
Optimal entry 40 50 55 60 70
Equilibrium entry 55 40 50 65 75
Excess entry 15 -10 -5 5 5
Consumer surplus 0.00 0.00 0.39 1.44 2.37
Producer surplus 0.00 0.00 0.09 -0.04 0.06
Total surplus 0.00 0.00 0.47 1.40 2.43
Max total surplus 0.00 0.04 0.55 1.40 2.43
Optimal entry 0 5 10 20 30
Equilibrium entry 0 0 5 20 30
Excess entry 01-5 -5 0 0
Consumer surplus 3.64 4.63 6.72 8.02
Producer surplus -0.08 0.28 -0.97 -0.69
Total surplus 3.56 4.91 5.75 7.34
Max total surplus 3.59 4.94 6.27 8.00
Optimal entry 40,45 65 70
Equilibrium entry 45 55 100 115
Excess entry 510 35 45
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Consumer surplus 14.60 12.00 9.6 7.74 5.81 4.94
Producer surplus -0.40 -0.30 5 -0.11 0.19 -0.17
Total surplus 14.20 11.70 9.42 7.64 6.00 4.77
Max total surplus 14.50 12.00 9.73 7.86 6.05 4.83
Optimal entry 30 40 45 45 50 45
Equilibrium entry 50 60 65 65 55 55
Excess entry 20 20 20 20 5 10
Consumer surplus 3.81 3.11 2.23 1.72 1.63 1.28
Producer surplus -0.05 -0.13 0.26 0.19 0.05 0.13
Total surplus 3.76 2.99 2.49 1.91 1.68 1.41
Max total surplus 3.77 3.01 2.50 1.96 1.70 1.46
Optimal entry 40 35 30 25 25 20
Equilibrium entry 45 40 125 20 20 15
Excess entry 5 5 1-5 -5 -5 -5
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Table 3: Effect of changes in cost parameters
This table illustrates the effects of changes in the fixed cost of entering a
market for a copyrighted work and in the marginal cost of producing an
additional unit of the work.
Consumer surplus 4.06 4.15 3.98 3.50 2.88
Producer surplus 3.81 1.67 0.02 -0.56 -0.15
Total surplus 7.87 5.83 4.00 2.94 2.73
Max total surplus 7.87 5.83 4.20 3.21 2.77
Optimal entry 150+ 150+ 85 45 40
Equilibrium entry 150+ 150+ 125 85 45
Excess entry N/A N/A 40 40 5
Consumer surplus 2.28 2.04 1.37 0.90 0.84
Producer surplus 0.02 -0.07 0.13 0.25 0.18
Total surplus 2.30 1.97 1.50 1.15 1.01
Max total surplus 2.30 1.97 1.62 1.45 1.19
Optimal entry 25 20 20 15 10
Equilibrium entry 25 20 10 5 5
0 0 -10 -10 -5
Consumer surplus 3.92 3.21 2.86 2.41 2.08
Producer surplus -0.22 0.07 -0.07 0.02 0.04
Total surplus 3.70 3.29 2.79 2.43 2.12
Max total surplus 4.04 3.35 2.86 2.43 2.15
Optimal entry 40 30 35 30 30
Equilibrium entry 65 45 40 30 25
Excess entry 25 15 5 0 -5
Consumer surplus 1.69 1.57 0.71 1.01 0.65
Producer surplus -0.04 -0.10 0.19 0.05 0.08
Total surplus 1.65 1.48 0.90 1.05 0.73
Max total surplus 1.68 1.48 1.27 1.12 0.96
Optimal entry 25 20 20 20 15
Equilibrium entry 20 20 5 10 5
Excess entry -5 0 -15 -10 -10
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Finally, Table 4 assesses the effect of changes in parameters
related to copying. The table shows that increased potential for
copying can increase social welfare. In the set of simulations for the
percent cancopy variable, optimal entry equaled equilibrium entry
when 50% of consumers could copy. When 60%, 70%, or 80% of
consumers could copy, there was insufficient entry, and yet total
surplus increased. This establishes that some increase in copying
can increase social welfare even in a market that has neither
overentry or underentry and even if that copying might lead to
underentry. The intuition is that broader copying increases
consumer surplus, and the phenomenon of business stealing makes
it more likely that this increase will be more than sufficient to offset
any decrease in consumer surplus attributable to reduced entry. Of
course, it does not establish that more copying necessarily will
increase social welfare. Indeed, once 90% of consumers can copy,
consumer surplus in this simulation falls dramatically. Moreover,
changes in the costof copy parameter have only modest effects on
total surplus, and these effects are not consistent.
Finally, Table 4 also provides limited support for the proposition
that some quality degradation in copying may be better than no
quality degradation, because the quality degradation leads the
consumers with the highest gross consumer surplus to purchase the
product. When copying produces very little quality degradation, for
example when quality-degrade = 0.90, total surplus is lower than
when there is significant quality degradation, for example when
quality-degrade = 0.40 or 0.50. The differences, however, are
modest here as well, and no clear trend emerges from this data. The
data on the maxquality.concern variable are still more difficult to
interpret, with changes leading to relatively small, inconsistent
effects. It is interesting, however, that total surplus drops to its
lowest value when consumers have no concern about quality
degradation from copying. This provides at least some support for
the view that in a world in which many consumers unquestionably
do care about quality, a copyright regime that allows for some
copying and some degradation in quality may be optimal. For
example, a regime in which consumers can obtain analog copies but
not digital copies of works could be more efficient than either a
regime that successfully prevented all copying or one that enabled
or tolerated some degree of perfect copying of digital works.
2004]
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Table 4: Effect of changes in copying parameters
This table illustrates the effects of changes in parameters affecting
whether consumers copy copyrighted works. The parameters reflect the
percentage of consumers who have the technical ability to copy, the quality
degradation from copying (including any decrease associated with psychic
costs of having a copy rather than an original), the maximum concern that
a consumer could have about quality, and the cost of making a copy.
Consumer surplus 2.08 2.47 2.34 2.55 2.28
Producer surplus -0.09 -0.58 0.00 -0.17 0.16
Total surplus 2.00 1.89 2.33 2.38 2.44
Max total surplus 2.37 2.38 2.42 2.49 2.46
Optimal entry 30 30 30 30 30
Equilibrium entry 55 60 40 40 25
Excess entry 25 30 10 10 -5
Consumer surplus 2.35 2.47 2.74 2.60 1.97
Producer surplus 0.08 -0.13 -0.16 -0.11 0.11
Total surplus 2.43 2.33 2.58 2.49 2.08
Max total surplus 2.43 2.37 2.58 2.59 2.55
Optimal entry 25 30 30 30 25
Equilibrium entry 25 25 25 20 10
Excess entry 0 -5 -5 -10 -15
Consumer surplus 2.22 2.21 2.40 2.39 2.30
Producer surplus 0.00 0.06 -0.31 -0.20 -0.01
Total surplus 2.22 2.27 2.09 2.19 2.29
Max total surplus 2.38 2.39 2.32 2.34 2.41
Optimal entry 30 30 35 30 30
Equilibrium entry 45 45 50 45 40
Excess entry 15115 15 5 10
Consumer surplus 2.59 2.54 2.54 2.12 2.08
Producer surplus -0.26 -0.29 -0.15 0.16 0.10
Total surplus 2.33 2.25 2.39 2.28 2.18
Max total surplus 2.45 2.36 2.41 2.37 2.46
Optimal entry 35 30 30 30 35
Equilibrium entry 45 40 35 20 15
Excess entry 10 10 5 -10 -20
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Consumer surplus 1.85 2.21 2.43 2.05 2.00
Producer surplus 0.16 0.07 -0.03 0.08 0.15
Total surplus 2.01 2.28 2.40 2.13 2.15
Max total surplus 2.56 2.54 2.54 2.41 2.42
Optimal entry 30 30 35 35 30
Equilibrium entry 10 15 20 15 15
Excess entry 
-201-15 -15 
-20 -15
Consumer surplus 2.48 2.26 2.11 2.63 2.24
Producer surplus -0.10 0.16 0.18 -0.10 0.15
Total surplus 2.39 2.41 2.29 2.53 2.40
Max total surplus 2.41 2.53 2.42 2.53 2.40
Optimal entry 30 30 30 30 35
Equilibrium entry 25 20 20 30 25
Excess entry -5 -10 -10 0 -10
Consumer surplus 2.25 2.68 2.22 2.16 2.39
Producer surplus 0.19 -0.12 0.20 0.23 0.06
Total surplus 2.44 2.56 2.42 2.39 2.44
Max total surplus 2.53 2.56 2.53 2.48 2.48
Optimal entry 30 30 30 30 30
Equilibrium entry 20 30 20 20 25
Excess entry -10 0 -10 -10 -5
Consumer surplus 2.83 2.49 2.27 2.78 2.62
Producer surplus -0.36 -0.03 0.04 -0.57 -0.26
Total surplus 2.48 2.46 2.32 2.22 2.36
Max total surplus 2.52 2.46 2.32 2.47 2.49
Optimal entry 30 30 30 30 35
Equilibrium entry 40 30 30 50 45
Excess entry 10 0 0 20 10
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